

COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

A Master's Thesis

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September 2003

To My Family

COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

**The Institute of Economics And Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

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**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

in

**THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

September 2003

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ABSTRACT

COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

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September 2003

During the Cold War years, the Black Sea was treated as a barrier and borderline rather than an integral part of the European politics. With the end of the Cold War, The Black Sea area emerged as a region on the physical and intellectual map of Europe with its political, economical, and military dynamics.

This thesis is a study on the role of cooperative initiatives to increase security in the Black Sea region within the framework of cooperative security. It aims to analyze the cooperative security efforts in the region with a certain emphasis on the post-Cold War developments.

This study argues that the strategic importance of the Black Sea region to the West, and to Europe in particular has increased substantially in recent years. Provided the region's geostrategic position as a natural link between Europe and Asia, and between

Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes a vital trade link as well as an important area of transit. Moreover, instability and potential for conflict in the region, its energy sources, and its economic prospects matter to the international community. At the same time this study argues that the BSEC, GUUAM, and BLACKSEAFOR as main regional cooperative initiatives have contributed to the peace, security and stability of the Black Sea region with their various activities. It evaluates that the OSCE, NATO, and the EU as wider European organizations have played an important role in projecting security and stability to the region through their various mechanisms.

Keywords: Black Sea region, cooperative security, concept, regional cooperation, energy, conflict, environment, EU, NATO, OSCE, BSEC, GUUAM, BLACKSEAFOR.

ÖZET

KARADENİZ BÖLGESİNDEKİ GÜVENLİK İŞBİRLİĞİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

Eylül 2003

Soğuk Savaş yıllarında, Karadeniz Avrupa politikasının entegre edilmiş bir parçası olmaktan çok, bir engel ve sınır hattı olarak algılanmıştı. Soğuk savaşın sona ermesiyle birlikte, Karadeniz havzası kendi politik, ekonomik ve askeri dinamikleriyle Avrupanın fiziki ve entelektüel haritasında bir bölge olarak belirdi.

Bu tez işbirliği inisiyatiflerinin Karadeniz bölgesinin güvenliğini artırmadaki rolünü güvenlik işbirliği çerçevesinde inceleyen bir çalışmadır ve bölgedeki güvenlik işbirliği çabalarını soğuk savaş sonrası dönem üzerinde yoğunlaşarak analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir.

Bu çalışma Karadeniz bölgesinin stratejik öneminin Batı ve özellikle Avrupa için son yıllarda önemli ölçüde arttığını ileri sürmektedir. Bölgenin Avrupa ve Asya, Orta Asya ve Orta Doğu arasındaki doğal konumu düşünüldüğünde, bölgenin hayati öneme haiz ticaret, ulaştırma ve nakil alanı olduğu söylenebilir. Bunun da ötesinde, istikrarsızlık ve bölgedeki çatışma potansiyeli, enerji kaynakları ve ekonomik olanaklar uluslararası toplumun ilgisini çekmektedir. Aynı zamanda bu çalışma Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilatının, GUUAM'ın ve Karadeniz Gücünün ana bölgesel işbirliği inisiyatifleri olarak birçok yönleriyle bölgedeki barış, huzur ve istikrara katkıda bulundukları belirtilmektedir. Ayrıca AGİT, NATO, ve AB'nin Avrupa'nın daha büyük örgütleri olarak birçok mekanizmalarla bölgede güvenlik ve istikrarının sağlanmasında önemli bir rol oynadıkları vurgulanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Karadeniz bölgesi, güvenlik işbirliği, konsept, bölgesel işbirliği, enerji, çatışma, çevre, AB, NATO, AGİT, KEİT, GUUAM, Karadeniz Gücü.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu. His invaluable guidance and immense scope of knowledge made substantial contributions to this study.

I would like to thank Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroglu and Asst. Prof. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya for examining my thesis and giving valuable comments and making recommendations. I want to declare that their advices will lead me throughout my academic career. Additionally, I want to express my great thanks to Pınar Bilgin for sharing her knowledge and giving support in courses and lectures.

I am deeply grateful to my wife Eylem Şenol and my mother Fatma Sakinci for their sustainable patience, support, and love. I would like to thank my elder brother Özer for his contributions.

Finally, I would like to express my thanks to all my friends and those people supported and helped me throughout this thesis.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AG	Assistance Group to Chechnya
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AX	Auxiliary Ship
BALTRON	Baltic Naval Squadron
BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BLACKSEAFOR	Special Task Force on Military and Naval Cooperation (Black Sea Force)
BSEC	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSNC	Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee
BSTDB	Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
CAU	Central Asian Union
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CBSS	Council of Baltic Sea States
CCMS	Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Area
CEI	Central European Initiative
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States

CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CNC	Committee of National Coordinators
CoE	Council of Europe
CSBMs	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD	European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
EDRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Center
EDRU	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Unit
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EU	European Union
FF/DD	Frigate/Destroyer
FOA	Friends of Albania Group
FS/PB	Corvette/Patrol Boat
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
GNI	Gross National Income
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova
GUUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HROAG	Human Right Office in Abkhazia, Georgia
IGOs	International Governmental Organizations
INOGATE	Interstate Oil and Gas Transport
INTERREG	Interregional Program (EU)
LS	Amphibious Ship

MAP	Military Action Plan
MEDA	Mediterranean European Development Agreement
MG	Minsk Group
MMFA	Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MSM	Mine Counter Measure
MVD	Non-Military Security Forces (Russian Police)
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIS	Newly Independent State(s)
OCEEA	Office of the Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PABSEC	Parliamentary Assembly of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
PCAs	Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PERMIS	Permanent International Secretariat
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Aid for the Restructuring of Economies (later extended to other CEE countries)
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
SECI	Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative
SEECF	South East Europe Cooperation Process

SWG/12	Special Working Group 12
TACIS	Technical Assistance to CIS
TENs	Trans-European Networks
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WP	Warsaw Pact

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, many analysts have emphasized the lessening of global factors and the increasing weight of regional forces in world politics that had operated under the surface of superpower confrontation. Especially in the decade after the Cold War, international and national politics have been increasingly shaped by regional as well as sub-national and local dynamics. In this study the post-Cold War security relations in the Black Sea region will be analyzed from the perspective of cooperative security. This subject of research is of interest due to the increased significance of the Black Sea region that came with the end of the bipolar rivalry.

NATO, with its eastward expansion, and the EU have increased their role in shaping the security initiatives of the region. The enlargement process of the EU will continually transform the region in Europe's direct neighborhood causing the Black Sea Region's security and stability to become vital for European security. The wars in the Balkans proved the value of the concept of "indivisible security". Located along existing or potential routes of energy transportation from Central Asia to Europe, the region is becoming a focus of the grand "geopolitics of oil".

The aim of choosing this subject rests upon three concerns. The first concern is to provide a good understanding of the role of cooperative security efforts in the Black Sea region in promoting peace, security and stability. The second concern is to stress the growing significance of the Black Sea region. The third is to provide comprehensive data about the regional dynamics of the Black Sea region to the academic, business, and policy communities, as there are currently only a few sources concerned with this.

When analyzing the cooperative security activities in the Black Sea region, this study does not aim to cover all aspects of security, but rather focus on the issues, problems and challenges which are shared by all or several Black Sea countries. In line with this consideration this thesis will attempt to provide answers to the questions stated below:

What is the meaning of cooperative security? What is its relevance concerning the Black Sea security?

What are the geopolitical characteristics of the Black Sea Region? (Where are the outer limits of the Black Sea Region? What are the interests of the major players of the region? What are the main regional security challenges of the region?)

What are the regional cooperative arrangements in the Black Sea region and what can be said about their efficiency?

What are the roles of wider European organizations such as the OSCE, NATO, and the EU in Black Sea security?

By these questions, while the scope of this thesis is restricted to the viewpoint of foreign policy considerations, it will be attempted to explain the contributions of cooperative security mechanisms to the security, stability and development in the region.

To fulfill these purposes, the second chapter of this thesis will be devoted to the analysis of the relevance of the concept of cooperative security in regards to the security issues in the Black Sea region. In this chapter, some new characteristics of the concept of security will be outlined and a framework for analysis will be presented. Finally, the same chapter will deal with the cooperative security practices of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.

Chapter 3 will provide information about the main regional dynamics of the Black Sea region. It will briefly examine the overall geopolitical setting of the region in the light of Post-Cold War realities. In the first section, the description of the region will be presented after examining different points of view concerning it. The second section will stress the importance of the region. The national interests of the main players will be briefly examined. Moreover, various challenges to regional security and the conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdnestr, Abkhazian-Georgian, Ossetian-Georgian, and Russian- Chechen conflict will be summarized.

Chapter 4 will give a general overview of regional/subregional cooperative arrangements in the region such as BSEC, GUUAM, and BLACKSEAFOR. These initiatives will be examined within three separate sections. In each section, their historical background, their main characteristics and their contributions to regional security will be studied.

The fifth chapter will focus specifically on the regional perspectives of international organizations such as the OSCE, NATO, and the EU. Their activities and roles in enhancing the security and stability of the region will be examined.

The last chapter will outline the answers to questions we posed in the beginning of this study and a brief overall evaluation will be presented.

This study is mainly descriptive. It examines regional security issues and development from a historical-comparative perspective. It is based on primary sources such as international agreements and governmental policy statements as well as secondary sources such as scholarly books, periodicals, newspaper articles, and articles available on the internet. Although there is a rich literature on the post-Cold War period, there are only a few books concerned with Black Sea regional security. Therefore, we mainly used conference papers, journal and newspaper articles and official documents as our sources.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY

2.1. A Framework for Analysis

With the end of the Cold War, security understanding has changed drastically. While the organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment were invaluable in guiding thought and action in the Cold War era, cooperative security is the corresponding principle for international security in the Post-Cold War era.¹ Due to the change in the international conjuncture, the dominance of traditional security studies has been challenged by new approaches to the concept of security.

On one hand, debates on the meaning and the concept of security have greatly increased. In the post-Cold War period, the security perception has changed. Increased intrastate conflicts, international terrorism, drug trafficking, the increased flow of small arms, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and environmental deterioration pave the way for looking at alternative security approaches. Economic performance rather than military capability started to be seen as the measure of a state's power. There are many internal factors that impede the growth of economic activities.² New concepts such as

¹ Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbruner. 1992. "A New Concept of Cooperative Security," *Brooking Occasional Papers*. Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, p.9.

² Syed Muhammad Ibrahim BP. 2002. "A Cooperative Security Framework For South Asia," Paper was presented at the South Asian Strategic Conference "Post 9/11 Developments-Implications For South Asia" held at Nagarkot, Nepal on 18 June 2002, Organized by *Regional Center For Strategic Studies*, Colombo, Sri Lanka, available at <http://www.rcss.org/papers/9%20Ibrahim%20.pdf>.

human security, societal security, indivisible security, security interdependence and new sectors consisting of political, economical, societal, environmental, in addition to the military sector³ have been introduced. While the military security is called ‘hard’, other threats to security are labeled ‘soft’. These terms and concepts are products of efforts to find alternative ways to ensure security. In other words, they are dimensions of security viewed from different paradigmatic perspectives.

On the other hand, the level of analysis problem has become complicated. It was also assumed that total security is not possible with a one-dimensional approach but required collective action.⁴ All of the above mentioned potential threats to security require intergovernmental or even trans-state actions. Bereft of Cold War patron-client relations, it has been necessary that international relations thinking give more attention to the gap between domestic politics and global international politics.⁵ In order to bridge this gap, the international community increasingly showed a deep concern over various aspects of security at national, regional and international levels. Buzan’s advice suggesting five levels in security analysis seems convincing:

- 1) International (global) system,
- 2) International sub-system (regional),
- 3) Units (national),
- 4) Sub-units (sub-national), and

³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security : A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., p.7.

⁴ Syed Muhammad Ibrahim BP, op. cit.

⁵ Peter Woodward. 1998. “Regional Security in North-East Africa,” available at http://www.eiipd.org/publications/occasional/20papers7regional_security.html

5) Individuals.⁶

This approach is very useful in understanding the implications of many issues, which are on the agenda of today's international relations, such as the global political economy, nationalism, regionalism, and threats to all kinds of security at all levels. This analytical framework also makes it easy to understand and evaluate the main characteristics of regional politics in a specific region or sub-region (In addition to these levels, the sub-regional level can be categorized as a level between the regional and national levels in international relations).

No single trend over the past decade deserves more careful analysis than the remarkable growth of cooperation among the countries of Europe, Asia and North America. Many new international organizations have been born, and a few of the old ones have been successfully transformed.⁷ Regional and sub-regional levels of analysis enhanced their importance relative to the Cold War period and to the end of the bipolar rivalry, which had had an empowering and dominant role on regional dynamics. Compared with the Cold War era, it is not making an exaggeration to say that Post-Cold War developments decreased the role of global actors on regional relations to some extent. The end of the bipolar rivalry gave states the opportunity of acting more freely, especially at a regional level. From the Barents Sea area, the Baltic Sea region, through Central Europe and the Balkans down to the Black Sea region, new frameworks and

⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, op. cit., pp.5-6.

⁷Richard Cohen. 2001. "From Individual Security to International Stability," in Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka. "Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order," *The Marshall Center Papers*, No. 3 The George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/cor05/>

institutions have been established⁸ and a lot of initiatives have been vitalized since the end of the Cold War. This has been done sometimes with the support of outside powers and sometimes with sole intentions of countries situated in the same region. All forms of regional cooperation whether supported by top-down or bottom-up approaches, took their right place on the agenda of international security studies.

Taking into account most of the post-Cold War realities, the concept of cooperative security seems among the most appropriate and consistent with its analytical framework providing the necessary analytical tools for examining the security relations among the countries situated in the Black Sea region. It covers the whole range of issues from soft to hard security. It confirms the idea that international relations follow their way through interactions among all the above-mentioned levels of relations.

2.2. The Concept

The use of the term cooperative security is relatively new, but the notion that states wish to work together to address security challenges has a long history.⁹ The concept of cooperative security has evolved over time. Its evolution goes back to the origins of the CSCE, which aimed, on the one hand, to further security, economic, and political as well as cultural cooperation between Warsaw Pact (WP) countries and Western Europe and North America, on the other, to prevent a nuclear war, in the early 1970s, and in particular to the notion of confidence building.¹⁰ After emerging from the

⁸ Bronislaw Gemerek. 13 October 1998. "Keynote Speech at International Conference on Subregional Cooperation," Stockholm, available at <http://www.msz.gov.pl/english/polzar/osce/keynotespeech.html>.

⁹ Randall Forsberg 1992. "Why Cooperative Security? Why Now?" *Peace and Democracy News*. Winter, pp. 9-13.

¹⁰ Olav F. Knudsen. 2001. "The Concept of Cooperative Security and Its Relationship to Policy," Paper was prepared for the panel "Reframing the Security Agenda of the 21st Century", ISA 42nd Annual Convention, Chicago, February 21-24, p.2, available at <http://www.home.datacomm.ch/sbrem/ISA2001.CoopSec.pdf>

CSCE internal diplomatic parlance, it became the issue for the Pacific regional conference in 1988.¹¹ In 1990, the term 'cooperative security' became part of official NATO language when the Final Communiqué of the Brussels Ministerial (Dec. 17-18, 1990) cited one of NATO's aims as being '... expanding our active search for a co-operative approach to security...'¹²

Cooperative security often involved "cooperation among adversaries" through multilateralism and various forms of international "regimes" that embraced expected norms and behaviors among the actors. With its expansion in the post-Cold War era that encompassed economics and the environment, the notion of cooperative security must also be expanded in a way that does not lose its original focus. While states remain the main referent of security and the focus remains on threats from other states, including (or perhaps even primarily) military threats, the problems they confront cannot be resolved solely through their own efforts. They also call for the stable and peaceful international environment necessary to advance the ever more highly prized goal of economic progress.¹³ Cooperative security can be defined as "a process whereby countries with common interests work jointly through agreed mechanisms to reduce tensions and suspicion, resolve or mitigate disputes, build confidence, enhance economic development prospects, and maintain stability in their regions."¹⁴ This definition gives ample scope to explore how cooperation can be promoted to deal with new concerns

¹¹ Ibid., p.2.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Syed Muhammad Ibrahim BP, op. cit., pp.1-8.

¹⁴ Michael Moodie January 2000. "Cooperative Security: Implications For National Security And International Relations," Sand98-0505/14 Unlimited Release, *Chemical And Biological Arms Control Institute*, available at <http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Links/about/papers/SAND98-0505-14/index.html>

while focusing primarily on cooperative security's relationship to violent conflict and the instruments by which it is waged.

The basic focus of cooperative security is to promote a security framework in which a wide range of co-operations that take place between politically diverse actors, through a network of institutions can lessen the likelihood of war among states, and to ensure a more secure environment in order to move from a security system based on deterrence to one based on reassurance.¹⁵ Cooperative security is practiced not only between adversaries, but also among non-like-minded actors as well as supposed friends.

Cooperative security does not ignore military or strategic interests of a state but recommends a mechanism for resolution of conflicts through dialogue. The core of cooperative security is to replace negative conflict with positive competition in multiple areas including the field of trade and commerce, as well as defense and security. However, according to a pessimistic approach, the objective of cooperative security is not a creation of stability or resolution of disputes. It calls for neither a fundamental change in the existing system, nor a creation of broadly accepted legitimate international and regional orders in which the states, of which the common aim is to diffuse actual or potential frictions/conflicts among participants by political dialogue, information sharing and transparency.¹⁶ Its main purpose is to limit the number of clashes as less as possible.¹⁷ Adopting such a limited thinking may bring nothing except pessimism and inability to take action. It may also obstruct more peaceful changes created with the help

¹⁵ Randall Forsberg, op.cit., p.8.

¹⁶ Moonis Ahmar. 2002. "Developing a Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia," Paper was presented at the South Asian Strategic Conference organized by the Regional Center for Strategic Studies on "Post 9/11 Developments-Implications for South Asia" held at Kathmandu, Nepal on June 16-19, 2002, available at <http://www.rcss.org/papers/10%20Moonis%20.pdf>

¹⁷ Ibid.

of hopeful expectations. It is apparent that this view is in contrast with the liberal view and the constructivist assumption that cooperative security thinking will lead to the creation of a secure community in the long run. It should not be forgotten that cooperative security is a methodology to create conditions, between states as well as other actors of international relations, of a sustained process of economic, cultural, communications and defense cooperation. The idea behind cooperative security is to gradually reduce the level of hostility and tension by promoting substantial trust and confidence in the benefits of sustaining the process of cooperation.¹⁸

Despite different definitions of cooperative security, it should not be ignored that the idea of cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective security¹⁹. Cooperative security is designed to prevent conflict in the long term and is promoted to ensure that organized aggression cannot be implemented on any large scale, whereas collective security is an arrangement for managing a joint response toward aggression by deterring it through military preparation and defeating it if it occurs.²⁰ Despite their differences it cannot be said that two forms of a security system are mutually exclusive and may not coexist within (parts of) a security regime.²¹ The UN is

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Cooperative security should be distinguished from collective security, collective defense, and common security. "Collective security: the agreement of a group to jointly punish aggression committed by any of them against any other in the group. Collective defense: the joint organization of defense as (e.g.) in NATO. Common security: a program for action based (inter alia) on the view that security is an international problem shared among adversaries rather than a national problem of any one country, and that traditional measures which increase the security of one state (or group) at the expense of another (e.g., *si vis pacem, para bellum*) exacerbate the problem rather than solving it." cited from Olav F. Knudsen, op. cit.

²⁰ Janne E. Nolan, ed. 1994. *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, p.5.

²¹ Elisabeth Johansson. 2001. "Cooperative Security in the 21st Century? NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue," Universidad De Granada, 5-9 De Noviembre De 2001, available at <http://www.ugr.es/~ceas/Documentacion%20Mediterraneo/2.pdf> op. cit.

the best example for an organization practicing collective security and cooperative security at the same time. Indeed a collective security joint response (or a military alliance) may function as the ultimate resort to deal with an armed attack if all preventive cooperative security measures have failed. Evans distinguishes cooperative security from the concepts of “common security”, “collective security” and “comprehensive security”. He claims that both common and collective security are inclined to over-emphasize military aspects of security despite their focus on non-aggressive and preventive measures such as confidence building. He believes that “comprehensive security” has a weak descriptive force within its wider agenda. He also claims that the concept of cooperative security covers the content of both common and collective security while also embracing some important multi-dimensional aspects of comprehensive security.²²

A collective study from the Brookings Institution advocates a confined definition of the concept of cooperative security. Although the development of a cooperative security regime holds normative aspirations, it does not aspire to eliminate all weapons, to prevent all forms of violence, to provide peaceful ends of conflicts, or to harmonize all political values. It provides a framework for the international community to organize responses to the all forms of threats and challenges.²³ It is more of a practical and pragmatic recognition that, although armed conflict is likely to be a continued feature of the international system in the foreseeable future, concrete measures can be taken to limit the scale and maybe even the number of conflicts in the short run. But this

²²Stephanie Lawson (ed.) 1995. *The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond*. Canberra: Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd. and Department of International Relations, RSPAS, Australian National University, p.9.

²³Janne E. Nolan, op. cit., p.8.

strategy may limit the scope of cooperative security by prioritizing military measures. All forms of cooperation including economic, political, military, transparency, gradual disarmament, industrial conversion, demobilization, demilitarization, all forms of CBMs, and even humanitarian intervention might be considered as elements of the concept of cooperative security.

2.2.1. Principles of cooperative security

As mentioned in the earlier definitions of the concept, a cooperative security system implies general acceptance of and compliance with binding commitments limiting military capabilities and actions. Instead of mistrust and deterrence, a cooperative system rests on following principles:²⁴

- 1) motivation to end confrontations and demonstrated will to follow such a policy;²⁵
- 2) confidence based on openness, transparency and predictability;
- 3) mutual reassurance;
- 4) legitimacy; which depends on the acceptance by members that the military constraints of the regime substantially ensure their security. The establishment of a shared ‘rule book’ of fundamental norms and principles governing the domestic and international behavior of states is a prerequisite for creating a cooperative security system.

²⁴Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1996. “A Future Security Agenda for Europe,” This report was prepared by the Independent Working Group Established by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament, available at <http://www.editors.sipri.se/pubs/iwg/iwg-report.pdf>

²⁵Olav F. Knudsen summarizes the characteristics of cooperative security as: 1) inclusiveness (that one seeks cooperation with one’s adversary) 2) weak confidence in the adversary 3) motivation to end confrontations, 4) demonstrated will to implement such a policy and states that “In relation to the concept

5) comprehensiveness; defined as acknowledgement of the link between the maintenance of peace and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as economic, cultural, legal and environmental cooperation.

6) indivisibility; which demands a common effort in pursuing security interests, as the security of each state or group of states is inseparably linked to that of all others;

7) cooperative approach; as embodied in existing complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions, including European and transatlantic organizations, multilateral and bilateral undertakings, and various forms of regional and subregional cooperation.²⁶ The premise being that security cannot be obtained by unilateral action and requires cooperative approaches across actors within a country as well as cross-national and intergovernmental.²⁷

8) inclusiveness; referring both to participants - the non-like-minded as well as the like-minded.

9) promotion of "habits of dialogue"; providing regional actors with the long-term benefits of undertaking regular consultations with the possibilities of establishing more formal and even official decision-making multilateral meetings on a regular schedule.²⁸

of security community, this is the name of the first beginning of a process that may perhaps lead to a security community later on" in Olav F. Knudsen, *op. cit.*

²⁶Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *op. cit.*

²⁷ Amitav Acharya. 2001. "Debating Human Security," paper was presented to the 15th Asia Pacific Round Table in Dewitt, David B. And Amitav Acharya (1996) "Cooperative Security and Development Assistance: The Relationship between Security and Development with Reference to Eastern Asia", Eastern Asia Policy Papers No.16. P.9-10.Toronto: Joint Center for Asia Pacific Studies, available at <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/acharya.pdf>.

²⁸ Ibid.

Regarding to the notion of cooperative security, Evans emphasizes the following characteristics:

It is multi-dimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament; emphasize reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favors multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and... above all, stresses the value of creating 'habits of dialog' on a multilateral basis.²⁹

Although the statement of Evans contains contradiction and ambiguity about the necessity of formal security institutions, most of the characteristics underlined by him seem compatible with the above-mentioned principles of cooperative security.

Any organization or state claiming that it is acting under the umbrella of cooperative security should comply with these principles. But these principles should not be evaluated in a strict manner. Such an attitude might be categorizing and restricting and it may lead to contradictions between various principles of cooperative security. The existence of gray areas in social sciences should not be denied, apart from black and white. Some analysts claim that cooperative security is only an accessible process for states that share the same values.³⁰ Such an idea is not consistent with the principle of inclusiveness and it may prevent the promotion of cooperative security. Mihalka's contrasting view asserts that even states not sharing common values can

²⁹ Gareth Evans. 1993. *Cooperating for Peace: the Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, p.16.

³⁰ Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, op cit., p.12. Cohen defines four security rings consisting of individual security, collective security, collective defense, and promoting security. He claims that NATO is the only cooperative security organization, which operates effectively in four rings of his cooperative security model. His paper argues that EU is moving toward becoming a de facto cooperative security organization with its current emphasis on European Security and Defense Policy.

cooperate, if their ruling elites believe that working together is better than acting alone and that they rely on a common future. He also points out that many members of the OSCE and the ASEAN, organizations acting in compliance with the concept of cooperative security, are quasi-authoritarian, transitional democracies, and not consolidated democracies.³¹ That's why, a low-level cooperative security between the states not sharing liberal democratic values can be mentioned.

Although the EU and NATO can be evaluated as cooperative security regimes acting under the principles of a cooperative security regime, it is difficult to mention the existence of a cooperative security regime in the Black Sea region. However, the BSEC, GUUAM, and BLACKSEAFOR can be thought as regional cooperative arrangements acting under some principles of cooperative security.

2.2.2. Cooperative security in practice

Cooperative security has been practiced all over the world, especially in Europe. As mentioned earlier, states have had a relatively more flexible international conjuncture after the end of the rigid bipolar system of the Cold War era. States have faced many non-traditional security challenges, which they have not been capable of dealing with alone. While many regional initiatives and organizations were being established, old ones had to make necessary changes in their structure to adapt to the new security environment. Cooperative security efforts against international terrorism have increased their significance especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Regional and international organizations and initiatives, whose purpose is to create a more secure environment via interactions and dialog processes, among all kinds of international actors over economic, political, military, socio-cultural, and

³¹Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, op. cit., p.31.

environmental issues, should be considered as the best confidence building measures (CBMs), and the best indicators of the implementation of the concept of cooperative security. Stating briefly³² the cooperative security efforts of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, together with regional initiatives, will provide good examples of the implementation of cooperative security in and around the Black Sea region.

The Alliance's cooperative security practices, which were designed to contribute to security and stability through political dialogue, transparency, information and confidence building, through specific security cooperation, have largely been based on three pillars. These are enlargement, special bilateral accords (Russia and Ukraine) and the creation of partnership initiatives. The 1992 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), the 1995 Mediterranean Dialogue and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which in 1997 replaced the NACC, are among the main initiatives. Based on the notion cooperative security, these partnership initiatives and outreach programs, have become the centerpiece of the Alliance's intent to create new security architecture for Europe and beyond for the 21st century.³³ The PfP program has become the most prominent instrument for the purpose of practical cooperation. It includes areas such as the democratic control of the military, developed contact on all levels, preparation of joint exercises and conducting joint peacekeeping operations. In this dialog process, partner countries and members are cooperating in the field of military security on a bilateral basis, for instance, the incorporation of officers from the Central and Eastern European

³² The role of the NATO, OSCE, and EU in the Black Sea security will be discussed comprehensively in the 4th Chapter.

³³ Elisabeth Johansson, *op cit*.

countries in national military staff colleges and higher education programs.³⁴ NATO officials are well aware of the fact that NATO's enlargement process should be conducted in parallel with the economic integration process, which is along the way of the enlargement of the EU.³⁵ It should also sustain the necessary broadening and deepening of cooperation between the Alliance and the interested Central, Eastern, and Southern European Countries.³⁶ It is an undeniable fact that both enlargement processes will contribute significantly to extending the security, stability and prosperity enjoyed by their members to other democratic European states. Building cooperative security can be enhanced through the ongoing enlargement processes of the EU and NATO. Such a policy can ensure regional stability and avoid new dividing lines in Europe. Thanks to the enlargement process, NATO's cooperative role in Baltic and Black Sea security might be enhanced to a large extent.

The EU's project of subregionalism can be assessed as a product of cooperative security thinking. EU officials use the term "sub region" in place of the term "region" in order to avoid causing marginalization and creating new dividing lines in Europe. The EU has established formal relation in terms of its foreign policy, in the central and eastern parts of Europe. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

³⁴ Igno Peters (ed.) 1996. *New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of Internal Institution; Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since 1989*. New York: St. Martin's Press, p.210.

³⁵ NATO. 1995. "NATO Study on Enlargement," available at <http://www.nato.int>.

³⁶ NATO Defense College (ed.) 1997. *Cooperative Security Arrangements in Europe*. Euro-Atlantic Security Studies. New York: Peter Lang. P.87.

(EMP) are among the initiatives that the EU has interacted with.³⁷ The EU supports and provides funds for subregional and regional initiatives. A good relationship between neighboring states is a criterion for membership of the candidate countries. Thus, the EU encourages cooperative security initiatives in its periphery to ensure peace and stability.

The OSCE's attempts to promote dialogue and decrease tensions by the implementation of CSBMs³⁸ and cooperative security principles on wide range of activities can be evaluated as cooperative security efforts. Similar to NATO, the OSCE has adopted a whole set of new assignments including assistance to the democratization process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), improving minority rights standards, the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, and crisis management short of peace enforcement operations. The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Chairman in Office, the Secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna have been applied as new organs and instruments to contribute to the solution of conflicts or containment of dangerous trouble areas.³⁹ The OSCE framework, which contains the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), has provided an important framework for arms control in Europe. In the post-Cold War period, despite its financial and coordination problems, the OSCE has been at the forefront of crisis management and conflict resolution in a number of serious disputes and conflicts in such countries and regions as Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,

³⁷ Elisabeth Johansson. 2001. "EU and its Near Neighborhood: Subregionalization in the Baltic Sea and in the Mediterranean," Universidad De Granada, 5-9 De Noviembre De 2001, available at http://www.unige.ch/ieug/B7_Johansson.pdf

³⁸ These measures contain military security measures adopted by OSCE members in Stockholm (1986), in Vienna (1990 and 1992). The Vienna document 1992, officially replaced the Vienna document 1990, is the first agreement that places actual limits on military activities.

³⁹ OSCE. 1994. "Annual Report," this report was edited by the Secretary General, Vienna, pp. 6-7, available at <http://www.osce.org>.

Tajikistan, the Central Asian republics, Latvia and Estonia, Moldavia, Ukraine, and the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

To put it briefly, regional and/or subregional cooperation offers a means of building confidence at the local and interstate levels in the Black Sea. The main essence of the cooperative efforts taking place in all of the security sectors in the Black Sea region can be grasped with the concept of cooperative security, suggesting wider security agenda and cooperation among all kinds of actors in the international arena. In this regard, the activities of the cooperative security initiatives such as BSEC, GUUAM, and the BLACKSEAFOR in the region might be analyzed meaningfully within the framework of cooperative security. Contributions from the wider European organizations, including the OSCE, NATO, and the EU, to the peace, security and stability of the Black Sea region might also be seen in compliance with the core principles of cooperative security.

An analysis of the geopolitical setting of the Black Sea region will show the value of cooperative efforts and the necessity of a cooperative security understanding in the region.

⁴⁰ NATO Defense College, op. cit., p.102.

CHAPTER 3

GEOPOLITICAL SETTING OF THE BLACK SEA REGION

3.1. Is the Black Sea a Region?

Before answering this question, it should be clarified what is meant by “region”. Firstly, the definition of a “region” should be made to answer the above question. It is a very difficult task to resolve this issue to everyone’s satisfaction. Concerning our subject, the definition of a “region” should contain geographical, political, economical, and military aspects of states situated in the same region.

In order to identify a region, many analysts emphasize the following criteria:⁴¹

- 1) Self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region, and perceptions by others that one exists,
- 2) Geographical proximity of members,
- 3) A degree of autonomy and distinctiveness within the global system,
- 4) Regular and intense interactions, and dialogue processes (remarkable interdependence),
- 5) A high level of political, economic, and cultural similarities.

⁴¹ David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.) 1997. *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, p.26.

A region can also be defined as a set of countries that are, or believe they are, politically interdependent. Constructivist theories perceive regions as socially created entities that have their meaning and importance because states treat them as sharing a common area and future. Critical theories define regions as products of region-building processes. Whether these processes are bottom-up or top-down, they are for special political purposes.⁴² Region-building processes should not be treated, as if their results were always negative. It should not be forgotten that under some conditions, countries that perceive themselves in a region might be more cooperative.⁴³ The Black Sea area may be seen as a good example of this.

Cooperative efforts, including regional cooperation arrangements (BSEC and GUUAM), various kinds of CSBMs (CFE Treaty, BLACKSEAFOR, PfP), are indicators of self-consciousness of the region. The Black Sea plays a unifying rather than a dividing role and it enables the region to meet the geographical proximity criterion. The above-mentioned structures, especially the BSEC, allow intense regular interactions. It is a geopolitical entity and a network of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral links. For now however, it is difficult to say a particularly high level of political, economic, and cultural affinities, but it seems that this criterion might be fulfilled thanks to ongoing cooperative relations. There is also a need for essential regional characteristics to be addressed, since the political will of the governments to


⁴² Iver B. Neumann. 1992. *Regions in International Theory*. Research Report No.162. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

⁴³ David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

develop a region is in place.⁴⁴ Today, it can easily be said that the Black Sea area is certainly more of a region than it was in early 1990s.

The term “Black Sea region” can be defined as the area covered by the eleven states participating in the BSEC (See Figure 1). The countries of the Black Sea region consist of six littoral states- Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine- and other more or less adjacent countries- Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, and Moldova.⁴⁵

Figure 1: Map of the Black Sea region⁴⁶



⁴⁴ The EastWest Institute. 16-17 October 2000. “Cooperative Efforts in Security of the Black Sea Region: Security Challenges and Cooperative Responses,” Conference report of the Black Sea Strategy Group First Meeting held in Bucharest, Romania, available at <http://www.ewis.org>.

⁴⁵ Yannis Valinakis. 1999. *The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe*. Chaillot Papers. Institute for Security Studies, p. ix.

⁴⁶ Available at <http://www.theodora.com/maps>.

The Black Sea region has become one of the foreign policy dimensions of all the regional states. Moreover, the European dimension is the top priority for the foreign policies of many countries in the Black Sea region. From a wider perspective, the Black Sea area can be treated as one of the sub regions in the European continent. However, calling this area a region should not lead to misperceptions. The term region has a simple meaning and might be useful in analyzing the realities and dynamics of the Black Sea region.

3.2. Geopolitical Importance of the Region

During the Cold-War years, the southern and northern shores of the Black Sea remained divided by ideological rivalries. The Black Sea was treated as a barrier and borderline rather than an integral part of European politics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea area emerged as a region on the physical and intellectual map of Europe with its political, economic, and military dynamics.⁴⁷

According to the modern theories of geopolitics, including the works of well-known geopoliticians, Mackinder, Spykman, Mahan, Schaclian, the Black Sea is situated in an important geographical place.⁴⁸ The Black Sea region lies at the center of the three strategically important areas: the Balkans, the Caspian Sea basin and the Caucasus. Within this context, this region has vital importance for the promotion of peace, stability

⁴⁷ Tunç Aybak (ed.) 2001. *Politics of the Black Sea*. London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p. xi.

⁴⁸ Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı (The Turkish War Colleges Command). Mayıs 1995. *Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği ve Türkiye (The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Turkey)*. Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Basım Evi, p. 2.

and security in all these areas.⁴⁹ Providing the region's geostrategic position linking Europe and Asia, and Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes an indispensable trade link as well as important area of transit.⁵⁰ It is true that the prospects for the Black Sea region to become the center of an energy transportation (See Figure 2) and trade network are very real. This network links the Caspian region in the East with Europe in the West, Russia and Ukraine in the North and Turkey with its Mediterranean hinterland in the South.⁵¹ The region's strategic meaning is due to the transportation corridors and existence of giant oil and gas reserves in the area. Due to its energy resources and economic prospects, instability in the region may cause negative implications for the international community.

Figure 2: Map of all pipelines in the Black Sea region (as of April 2002)⁵²



⁴⁹ Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p. 53.

⁵⁰ Yannis Valinakis, op. cit., p. 1.

⁵¹ M. L. Myrianthis, May 2001. "Eurasian Oil and Gas Routes in the Twenty-First Century," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 1(2): 124.

⁵² Available at <http://www.users.qwest.net/~kryopak/BlackSea.html>.

In geo-economic terms, with its nearly 330 million population, this region attracts the attention of many countries. The region possesses enormous potential for economic prosperity and integration with the world economy.⁵³ The region also has a potentially huge consumer market. Even though not directly involved with the Black Sea region they have substantial economic and transportation interests here. Iran, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uzbekistan have applied for membership to the BSEC. Additionally, Austria, Italy, Israel, Egypt, Slovakia, Tunisia and Poland joined the organization as observers; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Slovenia and Croatia submitted their applications for obtaining observer status.⁵⁴

The EU enlargement process and the ongoing NATO enlargement increased the significance of the Black Sea region.⁵⁵ Participation in the politics of the region via cooperative security arrangements including the BSEC, GUUAM, and BLACKSEAFOR is considered part of the European policy of Black Sea states. In this sense, Black Sea regional cooperation is increasingly being seen as an integral part of the European integration.⁵⁶ The EU reiterated its intention to avoid dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity beyond the new borders of the Union in

⁵³ IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board). September 2-3 2000. "Regional Dynamics of The Black and Caspian Sea Basin," *Conference Paper*, Odessa, Ukraine, available at <http://www.irex.org/programs/odesa-conference/index.html>.

⁵⁴ National Institute for Strategic Studies and National Institute for Ukrainian-Russian Relations. 1999. "Ukraine 2000 and Beyond: Geopolitical Priorities and Scenarios of Development," The monograph of the and. Kiev, NISS, available at <http://www.niss.gov.ua/book/engl/001.html>.

⁵⁵ The European Union. 11 December 1997. "Enlargement will Further Increase the Black Sea Regions Significance to the EU," Brussels: European Commission Report, IP/97/1103, available at <http://www.europa.eu.org>.

⁵⁶ The EastWest Institute, op. cit., p. 5.

Copenhagen.⁵⁷ The inclusion of ten new members will transform the region in Europe's direct neighborhood therefore the Black Sea region's security and stability will become vital for European security. In addition to the bilateral relations between NATO/EU/United States and Russia, the BSEC provides a useful multilateral framework for managing relations with Russia.⁵⁸ Taken into consideration its historical traditions and geographical position, its economic, human and natural resources and its new geopolitical role in a changing world, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that the Black Sea region has a promising future.

3.3. Main Players in the Region

Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Greece can be named as the main regional players in the Black Sea region, due to their relatively higher capabilities and their important geographical locations. These countries constitute the central North-South and East-West axes of the Black Sea region. They also constitute the dynamic core for the region. This is not to ignore the importance of other states and their important role in determining the center of gravity in the region.⁵⁹ But, it should be noted that understanding the perspectives of the core countries in the region has great importance in analyzing the regional politics of a specific region.

⁵⁷The European Union. 12-13 December 2002. "Presidency Declarations of Copenhagen European Council," available at <http://www.europa.eu.org>.

⁵⁸ Andrew Cottey (ed.) 1999. *Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe: Building Security, Prosperity, and Solidarity from Barents to the Black Sea*. New York: St. Martins Press, p. 247.

⁵⁹ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

Table 1: The countries of the Black Sea region: area, population, GNI per capita⁶⁰

Country	Area Sq. km.	Population (est.2001) million	GNI Per capita (2001) US \$.
Albania	28,748	3.4	1196
Armenia	29,800	3.8	560
Azerbaijan	86,000	8.1	650
Bulgaria	110,994	8.1	1560
Georgia	70,000	5.16	620
Greece	131,957	10.6	11,780
Moldova	33,843	4.3	380
Romania	237,499	22.5	1328.8
Russia	17075,400	144.8	1750
Turkey	766,640	66.2	2540
Ukraine	233,000	49.1	720

3.3.1. Russia

Although the Russian Federation is not a superpower in the post-Cold War era, it is one of the most influential actors in the international arena. With its great power status, it is also one of the most important Black Sea powers and it remains the dominant economic, political, and military force in the region.

⁶⁰ The data for Table 1 were taken from the official website of the World Bank, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html>.

The Black Sea constitutes a natural security zone for Russia. Russia views the Black Sea region as its natural defense line and a vital outlet to the Mediterranean.⁶¹ Despite the fact that its coastline inherited from USSR is now approximately only 30 percent of the former and it has only three of the 20 main coastal cities and only one advanced seaport, Novorossisk,⁶² the Black Sea continues to be a gateway to the world ocean for Russia.

Relations with the countries in the Black Sea region are vital for Russian foreign policy, due to economic, political, and security reasons. The dependence of other countries in the region on Russia in both energy and economic sectors strengthen its advantageous position in foreign policy making. There are many conflicts and disputes, which should be solved without sidelining Russia, through its southern boundaries.

Many Russian regions have maintained strong economical links with the Black Sea region. About 25 percent of Russian foreign trade is made via Black Sea routes.⁶³ Nearly 50 percent of Russia's foreign currency revenues are generated by oil and gas sales and for the Putin administration, increasing Russian energy exports to Europe is a priority.⁶⁴

The presence of the large number of ethnic Russians in the Black Sea region, the unsettled character of Russia's southern borders, increasing secessionist movements and ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, the military presence of the West in the region, and Russia's access to energy resources and routes are sources of concern for Russia. These

⁶¹Tatiana Houbenova-Delissivkova. 1999. "The Emerging Security Environment in The Black Sea Region," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 9(4): 7.

⁶² Nikolai Kovalsky. 2001. "Russia and the Black Sea Realities" in Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p.163.

⁶³Ibid., p. 164.

issues have created a volatile security environment for Russia's interests. Therefore Russia wants to remain strong in the area and have influence over the CIS members in order to ensure the security of its southern flank and politico-economic interests.⁶⁵

3.3.2. Turkey

Turkey is in a very important location on the intersection of the East and West and the North and South. It is in the vicinity of power and energy centers like Russia and the southern Caucasus. It has a longer experience of democratization and liberal economy compared to that of the post-communist states in the Black Sea region. Turkey has an emerging regional economy and market. The process of integration with Europe has continued to be the top foreign policy priority of Turkey in the post-Cold War era.

Turkey's geopolitical advantages for securing the energy corridor are admired by the US and other Western countries. Turkey benefits from its favorable position and many energy transportation projects are on the way of completion. Turkey's initiation of the BSEC took place because of the efforts of Turkish policy makers to integrate Turkey into the global economy and their desire to join the European Integration process.⁶⁶ The Turkish foreign policy elite sees the BSEC as another stepping-stone in Turkey's progressive advance towards European integration.

Increasing its trade with the Black Sea countries, diversification of energy supplies, reducing its energy dependence, realization of the oil and gas transportation project, and strengthening the independence and territorial integrity of the Post-Soviet

⁶⁴ Fiona Hill. 2001. "The Caucasus and Central Asia," *Brookings Policy Brief* No.80, p.4, available at <http://www.brookings.edu>.

⁶⁵ Timothy L. Thomas and John Shull. December 1999-February 2000. "Russian National Interests and The Caspian Sea," *Perceptions*, 4(4): 1.

states of the region are among the foreign policy priorities of Turkey in the Black Sea region.

3.3.3. Ukraine

Ukraine should be viewed as an important balancing power in the region. Ukrainian foreign policy has focused on finding its place within the East-West divide since it gained independence. Despite its self-consciousness about being a Black Sea power, the Black Sea region is not considered the most important component for Ukrainian foreign policy.⁶⁷

The Black Sea policy of Ukraine constitutes a southeastern component of its foreign policy. Ukraine sees the Black Sea region as part of the larger Europe. Similar to the views of other main powers, Ukraine considers the Black Sea a focal base for trade and energy transportation between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Western Europe. After the formation of the GUUAM, it has started to follow more active policy in the region. It's important for Ukraine to strengthen its strategic position in the Black Sea region. Unlike the East and the West vector, the Black Sea option does not demand that Ukraine make a choice between them. Currently Ukraine cooperates with both the East and the West.⁶⁸ The settling of conflicts is of vital importance for Ukraine as well as

⁶⁶ Melanie H. Ram. March 2001. "Black Sea Cooperation Towards European Integration," Paper was presented at the Black Sea Regional Policy Symposium, IREX, Leasburg, available at <http://www.irex.org/programs/completed/black-sea/ram.pdf>

⁶⁷ The National Institute for Strategic Studies and National Institute for Ukrainian-Russian Relations, op. cit.

⁶⁸ Maria Kopylenko. 2001. "Ukraine: Between NATO and Russia," in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald eds. *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 189.

relations of equal partnership with Poland, Turkey, Russia and other powerful regional leaders.⁶⁹

The election of allegedly “pro-Russian” Leonid Kuchma in July 1994 did not radically change the strategic direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy. The membership of the EU has been proclaimed as a strategic objective by the Ukrainian leadership.⁷⁰ Although Ukrainian membership in the EU would be less provocative to Russia and do more in addressing its socio-economic problems it seems more problematical and less attainable in the near future than NATO membership.⁷¹ Under Kuchma, Ukraine has adopted a balanced foreign policy between CIS and the West. Cooperation within the CIS structure has remained purely within the realm of economic issues. Ukraine remains a self-declared neutral, non-bloc status.⁷² Two leading domestic factors that prevent Ukraine’s integration into NATO and EU structures are the close economic ties and energy dependency upon Russia, and the disunity with regional loyalties and low national consciousness in eastern and southern Ukraine.⁷³ In addition to Ukraine’s close relationship with the West, 90 percent of Russian oil and most of its gas is exported to Western and Central Europe via pipelines through Ukrainian territory, this gives Ukraine a certain leverage in its dealings with Russia.⁷⁴ Due to various new

⁶⁹ The National Institute for Strategic Studies and National Institute for Ukrainian-Russian Relations, op. cit.

⁷⁰ Oleexander Chalyi. 2002. “Avrupa BirliğiYolunda Ukrayna: Kaçınılmaz Entegrasyon Süreci (Ukraine on the way of the European Union: Indispensable Integration Process)” *Stratejik Analiz*. 3(29): 84.

⁷¹ Taras Kuzio. 1998. “Ukraine and NATO: the Evolving Strategic Partnership,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 21(2): 2.

⁷² Ibid., p. 3.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 11.

⁷⁴ M. Mercedes Balmaceda. 1998. “Gas, Oil, and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50(2): 259.

projects such as the Yamal pipeline⁷⁵ Ukraine is likely to start losing its advantageous position with the transport of Russian gas to Central and Western Europe.

The transportation of Caspian energy, building of new transit routes, and preserving the territorial integrity are among the main interests of all GUUAM states involving Ukraine. Ukraine has important significant energy transportation interests in the Caucasus and it plays a serious role in the strengthening of regional cooperation and in the intensification of integrative processes. For Ukraine, importing some 85 percent of its energy requirements mainly from Russia, it is vital to diversify its energy supplies.⁷⁶ The activation of the new transport communication system (TRACECA project)⁷⁷ is very important to Ukrainian interests, because Ukraine will become a significant communication link between Europe and Asia. This project also aims to enhance economic and political independence of the republics in the region.⁷⁸

Ukraine's foreign policy activity is limited by the necessity to balance between the interests of Russia and the West. On the one hand, Ukraine follows multifaceted integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, social, and security structures. On the other hand, it supports the development of equal and mutually beneficial economic, political, and socio-cultural relations with Russia. Unlike the East-West vector of its foreign policy, the Black Sea vector does not create problems but presents opportunities for mutually beneficial trade and implementation of large-scale economic projects.

⁷⁵ The Yamal pipeline project is conceived as a gigantic pipeline project involving the development of gas fields in Siberia and its transport to Western Europe via a 4170 mile-long passing through Belarus.

⁷⁶ Taras Danko. 2000. "Perspectives of Economic Cooperation of Ukraine with the States of the Baltic-Black Sea Region," available at <http://users.kpi.kharkov.ua/liber/pecusb.html>.

⁷⁷ TRACECA is a program for the development of transport links between Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe and it is also for surface transport only. More information is available in the 5th Chapter.

⁷⁸ The European Union. June 1998. "Evaluation of the TACIS interstate TRACECA Program," available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg/evaluation/tacis-traceca/31.html>.

3.3.4. Greece

Although Greece has no borders on the Black Sea, it is a Black Sea country due to cultural, economic, historical and political reasons. It is among the most important members in the BSEC structure. Counterbalancing Turkey's political influence in the Black Sea area was the intention of the Greek government, especially in the first half of the 1990s. It was replaced by more pragmatic policies prioritizing trade and investment after 1996.⁷⁹ Greece with its relatively strong economic structure and balanced macroeconomic base is an important Balkan and Black Sea country.

Moreover, it is the only full EU member in the region. With its EU membership status, it plays a central role in the regional cooperation process. Greece is in a position to provide EU financial resources for regional projects. Its affinity with the Orthodox nations of the region might be perceived as another cultural asset of Greece for the region.

3.4. Main Regional Security Challenges and Sources of Conflicts

The end of the cold war increased the regional security issues in the Black Sea region and opened the "Pandora's Box". Old regional disputes have been reinvigorated and new regional security agendas have emerged. Due to the unsettled character of regional relations, internal weaknesses of post-communist states, and their susceptibility to outside pressures have created a problematical security structure in the region, especially in the Caucasus. Conflicts in Chechnya and Karabakh, Abkhazia-Georgia and Ossetia-Georgia, Transdnestr and Ingushetia-North Ossetia constitute the most important ones. Additionally, disputes between Greece and Turkey, Russia and Ukraine affected cooperative relations badly. These developments have prioritized military

dimensions of security. Despite the fact that there have been many issues concerning the political, economical, societal and ecological dimensions of security, these have stayed under the shadow of military security.

It is clear that there is more instability in the Black Sea region than in the West. People living in the region have felt the negative effects of conflicts. The conflicts hinder economic prosperity in the Caucasus. Because of the conflicts, oil transportation from the East to the West has been delayed to some extent and affected the process of planning alternative oil and gas transportation routes. Uncontrolled proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms undermines development in the South Caucasus.⁸⁰ The problem of refugees and forced migrants as a result of conflict, political and economic malaise are clearly of particular concern. Conflicts resulted in many hundred thousand internally displaced persons from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, North Ossetia and Transdniestr.⁸¹

In addition to the above mentioned problems, which are increasingly detrimental to the interests of the Black Sea littoral states and even beyond, the sea and the coasts are becoming one of the most polluted areas in the world.⁸² Intensified oil shipments and increasing oil terminals cause contamination of the sea and affect the fishing and tourism industry adversely.⁸³

⁷⁹ Tunç Aybak, opç cit., p. 52.

⁸⁰ Forum on Early Warning and Early Response. 28 Feb 2002. "Conflict Prevention in the Caucasus: Actors, response capacities and planning processes," available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rwb.nsf/0/1e916089974ee158c1256b97002d6f76?OpenDocument>

⁸¹ UNHCR. 1999. "Operations in Russian Federation," available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/ga99/rus.ht>.

⁸² Vladimir Aleksandrov. 1997. "Ecological Problems of the Black Sea," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 43(2): 87.

⁸³ Colin Woodward. 7 March 1997. "Reviving the Black Sea," *Transition*, 3(4): 50.

3.4.1. Greek-Turkish issues

Especially after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan and the earthquakes in the two countries, Greek policies towards Turkey have changed drastically. Greece approved the candidacy of Turkey for being a full member in the EU at the Helsinki Summit in late 1999. Today, the two governments seem to adopt a neo-functionalist approach. They are dealing with low-politics rather than high politics by implementing some confidence building measures.

Although there is rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, there are too many unresolved bilateral disputes between the two countries. The Cyprus issue, territorial waters, continental shelf, airspace and FIR, demilitarization of the Aegean Islands, undetermined sovereignty of islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean Sea, command and control problems concerning NATO in the Aegean Sea, and minorities in Western Thrace and Istanbul are some of the many issues.

Greece wants to submit only the continental shelf dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Turkey wants to solve all Aegean related disputes via bilateral negotiations. However, Ankara, in principle is not against bringing all the Aegean disputes together to the ICJ. Furthermore, the Cyprus dispute is an important factor that affects Greek-Turkish relations negatively. Time will show whether the rapprochement between the two countries will lead to solutions of disputes by peaceful means.

3.4.2. Ukrainian-Russian tensions

There have been potential areas of disagreement between Russia and Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow and Kiev have been at odds over a wide range of issues. The ownership of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian status over Crimea, in particular the city of Sevastopol, has been among the most problematic issues.

Additionally, the delineation of the Black Sea and the Azov continental shelves, international debt repayments, energy deliveries, and the shape of CIS have constituted other disputes between Ukraine and Russia.

When Ukraine declared that all military hardware on its territory belonged to Ukraine in 1991, debates over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet caused tension between Russia and Ukraine. The conflict was finally settled in May 1997, at least for twenty years the two parties agreed on the division of the fleet between them. A series of conciliatory steps taken by both sides in April of 1997 have pushed the impetus in favor of making a final deal. Ukraine agreed to have its navy participate in joint operational-strategic exercises with the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Yeltsin's government simply ignored Duma's appeal demanding "special territorial status" for Sevastopol.⁸⁴ The agreement was approved by both countries' parliament in 1998 and early 1999.

Crimea was the territory of Russia until 1954, when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev bequeathed it to Ukraine as a sign of friendship. Now, Crimea is part of an independent Ukraine with the status of an autonomous republic and of its population about 70 percent is Russian and 25 percent is Ukrainian.⁸⁵ Crimea is one of the most fortified harbors in the world and has served for more than two centuries as a main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.⁸⁶ Ethnic tensions were prompted in 1992 when some advocated for the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its annexation to Russia. In July 1992, the Crimean and Ukrainian parliaments determined that Crimea would remain under Ukrainian jurisdiction while retaining significant cultural and economic

⁸⁴ James Sherr. 1997. "Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black Sea Accords," *Survival*, 39(3): 33-50.

⁸⁵ Roman Popadiuk. 1994. "Crimea and Ukraine's Future," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 6(1): 30.

⁸⁶ Hakan Kırımlı. 2002. "Turkish-Ukrainian Relations and the Crimean Tatars," *Insight Turkey*, 4(2): 156.

autonomy.⁸⁷ Again Ukrainian authorities were faced with serious ethnically based unrest because of the separatist attempts of pro-Russian forces in 1994 and 1995.⁸⁸ Between the years of 1994-1997, various forms of provocative statements came not only from separatist pro-Russian forces in Crimea and extremist Russian politicians, but also from the Russian State Duma.⁸⁹ Following the Black Sea Fleet Treaty, the Major Treaty between Ukraine and Russia solved the question of Ukrainian territorial integrity on paper. Russia fully recognizes Ukrainian territorial integrity including Crimea and Sevastopol in this treaty. Additionally, the Crimean constitution satisfying both Ukrainians and the local Crimean parliaments was adopted in 1998. Ethnic tensions seem to be pacified in the region, at least for now.

Today it seems that both the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea issues are settled. In November 2000, Russia and Ukraine have managed to complete negotiations on land-border delimitation, while their differences on the maritime borders in the Azov Sea and the Strait of Kerch have been on the table and are no longer conflict prone.⁹⁰ Both countries have an opportunity to ease their remaining tensions and fully normalize their relations.⁹¹

3.4.3. Transdnestr conflict

As a result of Moscow's instigation and active support, the Transdnestr region declared its secession from Moldova in September 1991. In late summer 1992, a

⁸⁷U.S. Department of State. June 1997. "Background Notes: Ukraine," available at http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/ukraine_0697_bgn.html.

⁸⁸ Tor Bukkvol. 2001. "Ukraine and the Black Sea Region," in Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p. 105.

⁸⁹ Hakan Kırımlı, op. cit., p.156.

⁹⁰ Arkady Moshes. 2002. "Russian-Ukrainian Rapprochement of 2001: How Viable?," *Security Dialogue*, 33(2): 166.

negotiated cease-fire agreement enshrining the status quo in Transdniestr was signed. While not recognized by any other country, the region has been experiencing a de facto sovereign state. As long as the conflict is not settled, Moldavian authorities cannot regain control over the territory⁹². 100.000 displaced persons fled from the region. About 80 percent of them were Moldavians, 8 percent Russians, and 7 percent Ukrainians.⁹³

Russia pledged to withdraw its 2,500 troops, 50,000 weapons, and 40,000 tons of ammunition from Transdniestr by the end of 1999 in an OSCE Summit in Istanbul⁹⁴, but Russia is way behind the schedule in destroying and removing the arms and munitions from Transdniestr. The objectives of the Russian military in Moldova have been as follows: preventing the reunification of Moldova with Romania; keeping Moldova within the Russian sphere of influence; maintaining Russia's military infrastructure in Moldova's Transdniestr region.⁹⁵

According to a draft plan, endorsed jointly by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, and Ukraine in 2002, Moldova is supposed to turn into a federal state. The measure is apparently meant to settle a decade-long dispute between Moldova and its breakaway Transdniestr region. Under the plan, Transdniestr would have the right to its own constitution and to an equal number of deputies as

⁹¹Tyler Felgenhauer. 1999. "Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords," *WWS Case Study 2/99*. Detailed analysis is available at <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/ukraine.html>.

⁹²Alla Skvortova. September 2000. "Security Issues in the Black Sea Region: Factor of Moldova," Conference in Ukraine : Regional Dynamics of the Black and Caspian Sea Basins, available at <http://www.irex.org/programs/completed/conferences/odesa/presentations/security.asp>

⁹³World Bank. 2000. "Conflicts in ECA Region," available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/map.nsf/wPreview>

⁹⁴OSCE. 18-19 November 1999. "The Istanbul Declaration of OSCE," available at <http://www.osce.org>.

⁹⁵Allen C. Lynch. 2001. "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53(1): 12, in Fiona Hill& p. Jewett. "Back in the USSR". Russian Intervention in the internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Towards Russia. Cambridge: JFK School of Government, p.61.

Moldova in one of the chambers of the future parliament. But the plan has come under severe criticism from Moldova's opposition parties.⁹⁶

3.4.4. Georgia-South Ossetia conflict

Following the ethnic tensions and the abolition of the autonomous status of South Ossetia by Georgia in December 1990, conflicts began between Georgian forces and the Ossetian separatist in the spring of 1992. Ossetians demanded the unification of North and South Ossetia under the umbrella of the Russian Federation. Following negotiations between Georgian President Shevardnadze and Russian president Yeltsin, a cease-fire agreement was signed in June 1992, and a joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was deployed to the region. About 1000 people from each side were killed, and nearly 11.000 Georgians and 10.000 South Ossetians fled the region.⁹⁷ The situation remains unresolved and no solution has been reached in this conflict.

3.4.5. Georgia-Abkhazia conflict

In July 1992, Abkhazian separatists declared their independence from Georgia. This led to a war between the Abkhazian and Georgian government forces. Russia's role as mediator gave them opportunity to expand their influence over Georgia. After a violated first agreement between the separatists, Georgia and Russia, all three parties signed a second cease-fire on July 17th 1993. On May 14th 1994, Georgian and Abkhazian parties signed an agreement on the deployment of CIS peacekeeping forces in the region.⁹⁸ An estimated 250,000 Georgians have been displaced from their homes

⁹⁶Eugen Tomiuc. 11 July 2002. "Moldova: OSCE, Russia, Ukraine Present Joint Draft For Federalization," *RFE/RL Newslines*, available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

⁹⁷ World Bank, op. cit.

⁹⁸The NATO-Russia Archive. 2002. "Russia and the Caucasus," available at <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/RussiaCaucasus.html>.

since the conflict with Abkhazia erupted 10 years ago⁹⁹ In Abkhazia, the total population of Armenians and Russians is much more than Abkhazians and they are also more influential.¹⁰⁰

The peace talks with UN efforts continue. Since 1994 the Abkhaz have maintained that they will negotiate with Georgia only on creating a confederation in which Abkhazia and Georgia would be equal partners. Tbilisi, however, has consistently rejected that option, saying that it is prepared to offer Abkhazia only "the broadest conceivable autonomy" within a unitary Georgian state.¹⁰¹ The plan of Boden, who is UN secretary-general Kofi Annan's special envoy for the Abkhaz conflict, proposes the division of constitutional powers within a sovereign Georgian state between the central Georgian government and that of the breakaway Republic of Abkhazia. But there are two obstacles for a final political settlement of the deadlocked conflict. First, Abkhaz leaders have rejected any talks on the UN document as irrelevant, arguing that Abkhazia is already *de facto and de jure* an independent state. And second, Georgia is demanding the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping force,¹⁰² restoration of Georgia's jurisdiction and the security of returning refugees.¹⁰³ Since 1997, Georgia has been negotiating with Russia over the withdrawal of Russian border guards from Abkhazia.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹Robert McMahon. 31 January 2003. "UN: Resolution On Georgia-Abkhaz Peace Process Prompts Georgian Protest," *RFE/RL Newsline*, available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹⁰⁰Murat Şahin. 2001. "The Effects of Ethnic Distribution on Transcaucasian Political Geography," *Eurasian Studies*, Spring-Summer, pp. 43-44.

¹⁰¹Radio Free Europe. 29 October 2001. "How Does Abkhazia Envisage Its Future Relationship With Russia?" *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*, 4(36), available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹⁰²Radio Free Europe. 10 January 2002. "Will Georgia Insist On CIS Peacekeepers' Withdrawal From Abkhazia?" *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*, 5(2), available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹⁰³Maya Beridze. October 2000. "Georgia- The Eurasian Corridor," *Eurasian Politician*, Issue 2, available at <http://www.cc.jyu.fi>.

¹⁰⁴Duygu B. Sezer. 2000. "Turkish-Russian Relations," *Turkish Studies*, 1(1): 71.

Georgia has insisted Russia hand back the remaining two bases -- Akhalkaladi and Batumi -- within three years. But Russia has demanded 11 years for the hand-over.¹⁰⁵

3.4.6. Chechen-Russian conflict

Two wars have taken place between Chechens and the Russian federal forces, since the demise of the Soviet Union. The first war erupted in December 1994, when Russia intervened in the armed conflict between forces supporting elected President General Dudayev and his fundamentalist opponents. The Khasavjurt Agreement, which was signed in August 1996, ended the first Chechen war. According to the Russian-Chechen treaty, signed in Moscow on May 12th 1997, final status of the Republic was postponed for five years and Russian troops were withdrawn.¹⁰⁶

The second war broke out in the summer of 1999 when Chechen forces, under the leadership of Basajev, entered Dagestan and proclaimed an Islamic Republic. Russia intervened firstly with a bombing and then deployed ground forces. Russian forces managed to expel Chechen forces from Dagestan and from most of the territory in Chechnya. Conflicts still arise between some separatist elements and Russian forces today.

3.4.7. North Ossetia-Ingushetia conflict

Disagreement between Ingushetia and North Ossetia over the disputed Prigorodniy rayon, situated between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, led to conflict in 1992. Prigorodniy was an urban center and a vital piece of real estate for North Ossetia

¹⁰⁵Radio Free Europe. 10 December 2002. "Georgia: Russia to Discuss Withdrawal From Military Bases," *RFE/RL Newslines*, available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹⁰⁶The NATO-Russia Archive, op. cit.

and Ingushetia.¹⁰⁷ When large-scale violence erupted at the end of October in several parts of the Prigorodniy, Russia intervened with its paratroopers and MVD forces. A state of emergency remained until February 1995 but no solution has been reached, including a solution to the problem of the return of refugees. About 60.000 Ingush were displaced as a result of clashes in late 1992.¹⁰⁸ The Ossetian government considers the perpetuation of the status quo favorable and imposes strict conditions for the return of refugees.

3.4.8. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The twelve-year conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is among the most complex in the region. It is the first and the longest-running conflict occurring in the territory of the former Soviet Union. With Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, ethnic tensions came back to surface in Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous enclave of approximately forty four hundred square kilometers situated in the former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Rather than mentioning early historical developments, it should be stated that Josef Stalin placed this area in the territory of Soviet Azerbaijan as an Autonomous Oblast in the 1920s.¹⁰⁹ In 1988, Karabakh Armenians voted to break from Azerbaijan. Although article 70 of the USSR constitution gave the right of self-determination to the people of the Soviet Union, Article 78 indicated that borders between Union republics be changed only with the

¹⁰⁷Svante E. Cornell. 2001. "Cooperation and Conflict in the North Caucasus," in Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p. 209.

¹⁰⁸World Bank, op. cit.

¹⁰⁹Kalli Raptis. 1998. "Nagorno Karabakh and the Eurasian Transport Corridor," *ELIAMEP*, Occasional Papers, available at <http://www.eliamep.gr/4/4/main.asp?cat=4&scat=4>

consent of both republics involved.¹¹⁰ This triggered the violent conflicts that reached the level of full-scale war.

After the independence of Azerbaijan on 30 August 1991 and of Armenia on 23 September 1991, the issue transformed from a domestic problem into an international political dispute. The provincial authorities adopted a declaration proclaiming the independence of the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” on 2 September 1991. This was confirmed by a referendum on 10 December 1991.¹¹¹ This situation paved the way for mediation attempts by various countries and international organizations.¹¹² The OSCE’s Minsk group consisting of the delegates from the US, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Belarus, Turkey as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan has taken an active role in the peace process. The war ended with a cease-fire in 1994. The war between 1992 and 1994 left 30.000 dead and 800.000 refugees.¹¹³ Since May 1994 both sides have not violated it. At the end of the war the Armenians managed to take control of seven Azerbaijani provinces, including Shushi and Lachin, and use them as a buffer zone.

This Nagorno-Karabakh conflict constitutes one of the factors deteriorating the relations between Turkey and Armenia. Apart from this conflict, the Armenian government did not acknowledge its borders with Turkey, thus keeping in reserve potential territorial claims on Northeastern Turkey. The problem of the so-called 1915

¹¹⁰Stephan H. Astourian. Fall 1994. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Dimensions, Lessons, and Prospects,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 6(4): 91.

¹¹¹Sergiu Celac. 2000. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Question: An Update,” available at <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/Vol5/nkquestion>

¹¹²Elizabeth Fuller. 1993. “Russia’s diplomatic Offensive in the Transcaucasus,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report* 2, p.32, available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

genocide is also an obstacle in Turkish-Armenian relations. At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey adopted a neutral policy, which enabled it to depict itself as a fair mediator between the two countries.¹¹⁴ After the Armenians' massacre on Azerbaijani civilians in the Karabakh town of Khojali in late February 1992, Turkey followed a more pro-Azerbaijani attitude.¹¹⁵ Taking into account, Azerbaijan's deteriorating situation, Ankara has tried to explain and promote the Azeri view of the conflict in the international fore. Turkish diplomats played an active role in the OSCE -Minsk Group- seeking to settle the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Today, Turkey supports UN Security Council resolutions and the OSCE/Minsk Peace Process. As Azerbaijan's strongest ally, Turkey claims that relations will not return to normal conditions unless the Armenian government sincerely relinquishes territorial demands on Turkey's provinces. Armenia should also use its influence and force the Karabakh Armenians to depart from the territories occupied in Azerbaijan beyond the debatable enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.¹¹⁶ The Turkish-Armenian border remains closed today. The Armenians intensify their propaganda of the so-called 1915 Armenian-genocide allegations to exclude Turkey from the international arena and make Turkey impartial in the events of the Caucasus.¹¹⁷ The Armenian government puts Turkish recognition of the 1915 Genocide as a precondition to relations. Within this

¹¹³Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS). April-June 2001. "Black Sea Basin Regional Profile: the Security Situation and the Region-Building Opportunities," *Research Study 10*, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Research_Studies/Black_Sea_Basin_Regional_Profile

¹¹⁴ Svante E. Cornell. January 1998. "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 34 (1): 61-62.

¹¹⁵ Levent Demirci. June 2002. "Turkey's Political Objectives in the Caucasus," *Unpublished master's thesis*. Ankara: Bilkent University, Ankara, p. 36.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

context, it should be noted that positions of both sides on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are the main reason for the stalemate in relations between Armenia and Turkey. But, other above-mentioned problematic issues between the two countries are among the factors preventing good neighborly relations.

Regarding the current positions of both sides, Armenia has consistently desired the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an equal participant in the conflict and in the peace talks. It seems ready to exchange the Azeri territories they presently occupy for the international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent republic. Today no country, including Armenia, recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent republic. Armenia also wants guaranteed unrestricted contact with Nagorno-Karabakh through Azeri territory. Armenia places the Nagorno-Karabakh issue first.

Azerbaijan reclaims its territorial integrity, and proposes the returning of its refugees to their former homes and granting the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians broad autonomy within the confines of the republic. Azerbaijan considers Armenia, not Nagorno-Karabakh, to be the opposing side in the conflict and opposes any dialogue with Nagorno-Karabakh before the Armenia's aggression is dealt with. Azerbaijan insists on not defining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh before the recovery of the occupied territory.¹¹⁸

Minsk Group Aliyev and Kocharian parties came close to a peace plan during the last talks held in 2002. Reuters reported, without giving a source that Nagorno-

¹¹⁷ Ramazan Kılınc. 2002. "Regional Power of a Grand Strategy or Democratic Member of a Regional Identity: Turkey between Eurasia and Europe," available at <http://www.ir.metu.edu.tr/conf2002/papers/kilinc.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ Arif Yunusov. 1998. "New Approaches to Nagorno-Karabakh: A Window of Opportunity?" *EWI Policy Brief* No.3, available at <http://www.ewis.org>.

Karabakh would have "a high degree of self-government" while remaining nominally part of Azerbaijan, and that Armenian forces would withdraw from the occupied territory adjacent to the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic but retain control of the Lachin corridor linking the enclave with Armenia. Armenia would also guarantee free communication across its territory between Azerbaijan and its enclave of Nakhichevan.¹¹⁹ Due to the domestic and political opposition in both countries, neither side approved these statements. The leaders of both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have also come out with maximizing statements in recent months.¹²⁰

The situation in the Caucasus and Transdniestr might be defined with the terms "no peace, no war".¹²¹ In all cases, most of the violence has been ended by cease-fires, but settlement of legal status remains unsolved. While national governments continue to insist on their territorial integrity, secessionists claim their right to national self-determination. In the long run, regional or subregional economic and political structures might play a more influential role in overcoming these contradictions and preventing the spread of conflicts by creating a general platform for collaboration in the sphere of security with the maximum account for interests of all states of the region.

Today, one can easily be said that the Black Sea area is certainly more of a region than it was in early 1990s. This region comprises an eleven-member country subsystem connecting the European Union to Southeastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus

¹¹⁹Radio Free Europe. 14 May 2002. "Is A Karabakh Accord Likely To Be Signed In Geneva?" *RFE-RL Caucasus Report*, 4(18), available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹²⁰Radio Free Europe. 7 March 2002. "Fronts Harden On Eve Of Minsk Group Co-Chairs' Visit" *RFE-RL Caucasus Report*, 5(9), available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹²¹Edward W. Walker. 1998. "No Peace, No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist Conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh," Strengthening Democratic Institution, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wae01>

NIS and the former Soviet Union.¹²² It has a growing significance in the post-Cold War era due to the early mentioned reasons. But, it should be noted that the Black Sea region is a region in the process of being built. The process has not been completely finished.

All the Black Sea states and their people are well aware of the fact that economic recovery, peace and stability in the region are their common interests. They should also see regional cooperation as the most promising strategy for obtaining these goals. In this context, transformation of the conflicts of interests in the region into the cooperative efforts of the interested parties might allow all countries to enjoy long lasting peace, prosperity and sustainable growth within the region. The core countries need to be engaged in the search for solutions together with the US and relevant IGOs and NGOs.

¹²²M. L. Myrianthis., op. cit., p. 124.

CHAPTER 4

REGIONAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY INITIATIVES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Since the Black Sea region is located in the trade and geopolitical crossroads of Europe and Asia, it has been a place where people of various nationalities, traditions, cultures and religions have lived together and intermingled since ancient times. Although the efforts to build bridges, enhance mutually beneficial trade relations, and contribute to the rapprochement among neighboring nations have been made for centuries, for many decades after the Second World War, the political atmosphere in the region was characterized by mutual mistrust and suspicion between the countries divided by the East-West confrontation. With the end of the Cold War, the countries of the region have won a new chance to revive their cooperative spirit.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, new regional initiatives have been taken in the region. The BSEC, the GUUAM and BLACKSEAFOR are among the most important and most efficient cooperative regional arrangements. From a wider perspective, these initiatives can be perceived as elements contributing to peace and stability not only in the region, but also in the whole European continent.

In addition to the larger European security organizations such as the EU, NATO and the OSCE, the regional initiatives in the Black Sea region provide frameworks for cooperation among states and peoples of the region in a wide variety of subtle and complex ways.¹²³ Among them, the BSEC and the GUUAM may be considered as economically based arrangements and CSBMs. The BLACKSEAFOR may be classified as a mainly military arrangement. All of them, however, involve political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions.

4.1. Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

The BSEC is the most important cooperative arrangement in the region, since it is the largest and basically the only comprehensive regional economic organization of the Black Sea region.¹²⁴ It also represents a potentially useful vehicle for regional integration.¹²⁵ At the same time, the BSEC is the most longstanding and highly institutionalized region-building project in the southeast.¹²⁶ The BSEC, as opposed to other regional initiatives developing under the supervision of the EU or US, is a self-made grouping.¹²⁷

The BSEC has opened a new and special chapter in Black Sea regional history. It was established at a time when the Balkans and the Caucasus were facing great unrest and difficulties, coupled with ethnic conflicts. The BSEC has proved itself to be a forum where the participating states put aside their differences to undertake joint economic projects for their mutual benefit. It proved to be a regional arrangement where economic

¹²³Andrew Cottey, op. cit., p. 3.

¹²⁴The EastWest Institute, op cit.

¹²⁵Gareth M. Winrow. May 2000. "Energy Security in the Black Sea Region: Economic Interdependence or Commercial and Political Rivalry?" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2(2): 137.

¹²⁶Charles King. Summer 2001. "The New Near East," *Survival*, 43(2): 54.

motives transcended political conflicts.¹²⁸ Since 1992, the BSEC has made substantial progress. It established the Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS), Parliamentary Assembly (PABSEC) and Business Council. In 1999, BSEC transformed itself into a regional economic organization and established its own financial institution, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB). The importance of this organization might be covered by examining its roots and characteristics as well as its efficiency.

4.1.1. Historical overview

The attempt to create a regional cooperation organization among the Black Sea countries came at a time of momentous change. There appeared to be a growing need for greater cooperation, collaboration and joint achievements.¹²⁹ The formation of a regional organization for economic cooperation among countries around the Black Sea had been suggested to President Turgut Özal first by Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, former head of the Turkish mission in Washington, DC.¹³⁰ The former USSR, some republics of the former USSR (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), Bulgaria and Romania expressed their support for the project. Thus, Turkey pursuing the leadership role, initiated the process. The representatives of these countries were brought together in December 1990 in Ankara.¹³¹ At the end of the meeting, they officially declared that

¹²⁷ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

¹²⁸ Ercan Özer. November 1997. "Foreign Economic Policy and Relations of Turkey: The Regional Perspective," *Perceptions*, 2(3), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>

¹²⁹ Oya Akgönenç Mughisuddin. 1998. "Ventures in Regional Cooperation: The Balkans and the Black Sea Regional Cooperation," in Levent Bilman. September-November 1998. "The Regional Cooperation Initiatives in Southeast Europe and the Turkish Foreign Policy," *Perceptions*, 3(3), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/III-3/bilman.htm>.

¹³⁰ Oktay Özüye. 1992. "Black Sea Economic Cooperation," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 3(3): 49.

¹³¹ Ömer Faruk Gençkaya. 1993. "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Regional Challenge to European Integration," *UNESCO*, Southampton: Blackwell Publishers, 44(4): 550-552.

they agreed to form a Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone together with Turkey. A decision was reached to prepare a document containing the essential principles guiding economic cooperation in the region. In this context, Turkey was entrusted with the duty of preparing a draft document following a meeting at the technical level in Bucharest on March 12th-13th 1991. Later the Work Group met in Sofia on April 23rd-25th 1991 and in Moscow on July 11th-12th 1991. They drafted a document determining the framework for regional cooperation. Following these three rounds of talks, with Ukraine joining later, the Foreign Ministers got together in February 1992 in Istanbul and agreed to sign the declaration, consisting of 18 Articles, establishing the BSEC. Following the approval of the application for membership of Greece and Albania, the BSEC Summit Declaration was signed on June 25th, 1992 in Istanbul by the Presidents or Prime Ministers of 11 states.¹³² With the signing of the Summit Declaration, the BSEC was founded as a regional structure for multilateral cooperation. Thus, the formative stage, the period from the emergence of the BSEC on June 25th 1992 to the establishment of PERMIS on March 10th 1994, had begun.

In the consolidation period, two major steps were taken: the Bucharest Statement from high-level meetings of the heads of state or government (June 30th 1995) and the Moscow Declaration (October 25th 1996). These were milestones in shaping the BSEC. The Bucharest Statement formulated the parameters for priority areas of cooperation. It gave prominence to the private sector and extended the areas of cooperation to cover the combating of organized crime, the illicit trafficking of drugs

¹³² Serdar Sayan. 1998. "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Substitute for or a Complement to Globalization Efforts in the Middle East and the Balkans?" *Working Paper* No: 9806, Cairo, Egypt: Economic Research Forum, available at http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~sayan/DiscussionPapers/ERF_WP_9806.pdf

and weapons and all acts of terrorism and illegal border crossings. The Moscow Declaration officially provided a vision for the transformation of the BSEC region into a free trade area.¹³³

The Yalta Summit, on June 5th 1998, concluded the BSEC Charter. Following the ratification formalities, the Charter came into force marking the official inauguration of the organization of the BSEC on May 1st 1999.¹³⁴ By this act, the BSEC pledged the enduring commitment of its eleven signatories, emerged as a regional economic organization, acquired a new status with legal identity on the international arena, and adopted a legally binding charter replacing the political declaration of Istanbul as its principal instrument. With the Istanbul Summit declaration, of November 17th, 1999 the BSEC ushered in a result-oriented programs and projects stage.¹³⁵ Today the organizational structure, which was established by the founding Charter, operates as in previous years in the intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary, inter-business, financial and academic levels.

4.1.2. Main characteristics of the BSEC

The BSEC is set to contribute to regional and consequently global peace through economic cooperation and prosperity. The security function of the BSEC is based on the formula that economic cooperation is the most effective CBM. Regional cooperation promotes security and stability through closer economic ties and greater interdependence. Thus, economic cooperation acts as a catalyst for security. In the

¹³³ Nicolae Ecobescu. September 2001. "Prospects for the Future Development of the BSEC," *Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies*, 1(3): 166.

¹³⁴ The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was converted into The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. However, BSEC remained as the acronym of the Organization.

¹³⁵ Detailed information is available at <http://www.bsec.gov.tr>.

summit declaration of 1992, the participating heads of state and government confirmed their intention to develop economic cooperation as a contribution to the CSCE process, and to the establishment of a Europe-wide economic area as well as to the achievement of a higher degree of integration of the participating states within the world economy.¹³⁶

The BSEC was developed as a framework for regional cooperation with various aspects. Following the summit declaration of the BSEC, signed on June 25th 1992 in Istanbul, the principles and the objectives of cooperation have been stated in several founding documents; The Bosphorus Statement of June 25 1992, The Bucharest Statement of the High Level Meeting of the BSEC Participating states of June 30th 1995, the Moscow Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Participating States of the BSEC of October 25th 1996, and the Yalta Summit Declaration of 5 June 1998¹³⁷ and finally, the Charter of the Organization of the BSEC, which will transform the BSEC into a fully-fledged regional economic organization signed during the Yalta Summit. In all the above-mentioned documents, the main purpose of the BSEC was defined as the promotion of ‘comprehensive multilateral and bilateral’ economic cooperation and, on this basis, the consolidation of peace and stability in the Black Sea Region.

The BSEC is a highly institutionalized organization. It has been institutionalized in line with the Permanent International Secretariat (PERMIS), PABSEC, the Business Council of the BSEC, BSTDB and the Coordination Center for Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information. The Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MMFA) is the main decision making body of the BSEC. Foreign

¹³⁶ Ercan Özer, op. cit.

¹³⁷ See Appendix 1.

Ministers of the BSEC meet at least twice a year, preceded by meetings of senior officials. In addition to this, day-to-day work is undertaken by working groups. A total of eighteen working groups from transportation to energy develop regional projects. The PABSEC meets twice a year. The advisory status of the PABSEC, through its permanent committees, also contributes legal-institutional developments within the BSEC structure. The BSEC Business Council represents the business communities of these 11 countries and was launched a few months after the intergovernmental BSEC initiative. The Business Council is an international non-governmental organization designed to promote cooperation among the business communities of the 11 countries and is one of the related bodies of the organization of the BSEC. The BSEC operates on five different platforms involving intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary, inter-business, banking and finance, and academics.

The BSEC represents the strong political will of the member states to establish and maintain dialogue and cooperation at different levels and dimensions including governments, parliaments, the private sector, local administrations, NGOs, and academicians. Having started as a “top-down” approach”, it is gradually turning into a “bottom-up approach”.¹³⁸

The BSEC acts on a wide spectrum of cooperation. The Charter foresees priority areas as trade and economic development, banking and finance, communications, energy, transport, agriculture and agro-industry, health care and pharmaceuticals, environmental protection, tourism, science and technology, exchange of statistical data and economic information, collaboration between customs and other

¹³⁸ Ercan Özer, *op. cit.*

border authorities, human contacts, combating organized crime, illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and radioactive materials, all acts of terrorism and illegal migration.

It should be stressed that the BSEC is not a traditional regional security organization. It facilitates the creation of an external regional environment in which the smooth transition to democracy and market economy can be fostered. In the long run, it is expected to contribute to further regional cooperation.¹³⁹

While the CBSS and the BEAC have developed further in the post-Cold War regional/subregional groups, the BSEC has developed relatively slowly. The main reason lies in that they have received political, economic and technical support from the wealthy Nordic states.¹⁴⁰ The EU and NATO have also actively supported these initiatives. The CBSS, the BEAC, and the BSEC have diverse memberships and similar objectives. On the one hand, Russian membership in these three organizations provides Western countries with the chance of deepening cooperative ties with Russia. On the other, it makes them more likely to have a more permanent role to play¹⁴¹ since Russia and other countries appear unlikely to join Euro-Atlantic Structures.

When examined, the structure and development process of the BSEC unveils itself as mainly a soft security power. Military security is not listed on the agenda and it concentrates on economic, social and cultural cooperation. It acts in conformity with the principles of the cooperative security concept. It continues to be the most important cooperative security arrangement in the region, because it is the largest, most

¹³⁹ Tunç Aybak. 2001. "Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Turkey: Extending European Integration to the East?" in Tunç Aybak, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁴⁰ Andrew Cottey, *op cit.*, p. 246.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

longstanding, highly institutionalized and basically the only comprehensive regional economic organization of the Black Sea region.

4.1.3. Efficiency of the BSEC

Analysts make diverse evaluations about the efficiency of the BSEC, so the assessment of the BSEC's performance gives mixed results. It is possible to examine the issue from both a pessimistic and an optimistic point of view. When pessimism is adopted, its implications may become causes for adopting a more optimistic approach about what it has accomplished so far. Although there are some negative factors in BSEC's credibility, in general, there are many reasons for looking through the lens of optimism.

As far as a pessimistic view is concerned, one can easily find a discrepancy between the proclaimed objectives and the degree of implementation of numerous projects adopted under the BSEC aegis. Despite its declared intentions and the progress in preparing several very promising projects, the BSEC has so far failed to achieve many of its practical goals and little substantial cooperation has been established. Before its organizational status, the BSEC's activities were limited to discussions and usually no binding documents were signed. The BSEC still lacks a clear priority or unifying core for its activities. The development of regional trade remains embryonic. Moreover, bilateral trade relations between most of the BSEC members are underdeveloped. Very often the main trading partners of BSEC members are outside powers. The BSEC has played no direct role in managing or resolving the serious conflicts among its members (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Ukraine, and Greece and Turkey, and in Georgia and Moldova), nor does it seem likely to.

Today the BSEC is the most diverse among the other regional groups in the Barents-Black Sea belt. The relative poverty of the BSEC members means that they have few resources to support cooperation. The BSEC's relation with potential external fund providers of the project, particularly the EU and the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), are less developed than those of the CBSS, the BEAC and the CEI, although such ties are now expanding.¹⁴² Other groups in the Barents-Black Sea either have strong Western involvement as in the BEAC, the CBSS and the CEI, or are much smaller in size and hence more coherent as the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).¹⁴³ The diversity of EU ties with the BSEC members (EU member Greece, Associates Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the former Soviet states which have partnership and cooperation agreements with the EU) complicate EU financial support for BSEC activities. Most observers, however, suggest that if the BSEC is to develop further it must define practical cooperation projects (in areas such as economics, environment and infrastructure) and gain external financial support for these projects from organizations such as the EBRD, the EU and the World Bank.¹⁴⁴

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, from a political point of view, the BSEC's existence for more than eleven years can already be assessed as a moderate success. One should not forget the opinion that the BSEC process as a whole is in its infancy. As it was appreciated at the Tbilisi International Round Table "The Black Sea is

¹⁴²Andrew Cottey. June 2000. "Europe's New Subregionalism," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 23(2): 34.

¹⁴³ Oleksandr Pavliuk. 1999. "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Will Hopes Become Reality?" in Andrew Cottey., op. cit. pp. 134-135.

¹⁴⁴ Andrew Cottey, op. cit., *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, p. 34.

not yet a region in being. It is a region in making.”¹⁴⁵ Its transformation into a regional economic organization with a legal identity on the international scene is the most convincing argument in this respect.¹⁴⁶ Given the past and present differences, tensions, and sometimes even armed conflicts, between some of its members the Group’s existence indicates that the Black Sea states wish to pursue cooperation with one another.

When the BSEC was established, the regional countries gradually came to realize that the BSEC could be utilized as a framework for cooperation within which regional interdependence could be managed.¹⁴⁷ It is perceived as an instrument for the development and diversification of existing economic relations among the countries around the Black Sea, by making efficient use of the advantages arising from their geographical proximity, traditional ties, the complementary nature of their economies and the large economic space and market. Towards the end of the 1990s the regionalization of the Black Sea increased in salient regional issues such as energy and trade. The other countries’ attitude towards the BSEC has changed accordingly. Although the BSEC has been limited by the diversity of its members and its lack of resources, it has made a positive contribution to cooperative security in the Black Sea region. It has provided a neutral context in which all Black Sea states could meet. For NIS countries, the BSEC provided a platform outside Russia’s influence and hegemony. The BSEC enables these countries to have an equal voice with Russia. Its functionalist style and piecemeal approach to regional issues, in the long run, may generate a regional

¹⁴⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 9-10 March 1999. “International Round Table: the Black Sea Economic Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st Century,” available at <http://www.mfa.gov.ge>

¹⁴⁶ Nicolae Ecobescu, op. cit., p. 165.

¹⁴⁷ Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p. 56.

sense of common interest and an establishment of regional economic infrastructure may create incentives for further regional economic cooperation.¹⁴⁸ The recognition of the BSEC by the EU as a complementary cooperative framework to European integration has also reinforced its status and legitimacy in other countries' quest to join Europe.¹⁴⁹ In this sense, the BSEC provides a safeguard in the enlargement of the EU to the Black Sea region.¹⁵⁰

The BSEC, during the 11 years since its inception, has asserted itself to be an important CSBM and, as such, an essential element of peace and stability in the region. The varying national interests, differing political assessments and diverse stages of development of the participating states have not prevented them from seeking common solutions to their problems through dialogue, economic cooperation, or creating an environment conducive to regional stability.¹⁵¹ The BSEC contributes to regional stability and security by promoting dialogue, diplomacy, development and democracy. It is mainly a soft security provider. It aims to allay tensions between the participating states by providing opportunities for cooperation and creating a mutually beneficial economic equilibrium. The initiation and the following institutionalization of the BSEC have been important achievements. In fact, with the recent ratification of its Charter in the national parliaments of Black Sea countries, it has completed its formative phase and consolidated its legal status as a proper regional organization.¹⁵² This has recently transformed the political initiative of the Istanbul Summit into its new phase with legally

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Melanie H. Ram, *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁰ Tunç Aybak, *op. cit.* p.56.

¹⁵¹ Ercan Özer, *op. cit.*

¹⁵² Tunç Aybak, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

binding obligations for member states.¹⁵³ The BSEC has succeeded in setting up an organizational structure, contributing to better mutual understanding and establishing itself in the international arena.¹⁵⁴ It's evident that the BSEC has contributed to the fostering a growing awareness by member states of their regional identity and perhaps the development of a synergy among the eleven Member states. The development of the BSEC into a prestigious regional economic organization occupying an important place in the new European architecture is a fact today.¹⁵⁵ At present, despite the political odds against it, cooperation in the Black Sea region is not only a promising possibility, but also a convincing reality.¹⁵⁶

Although not formally under BSEC auspices, the Black Sea littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) signed an Agreement on the establishment of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group, known as BLACKSEAFOR, in April 2001. Additionally, the final document on CSBMs with regard to naval activities in the Black Sea was signed on April 25th 2002 by six Black Sea states and will come into force on January 1st 2003 when the preparations for implementation are complete. The contributing role of the BSEC is regards to these developments should not be ignored. Since 1992, the BSEC has provided for institutionalization and intensification of relations between countries in the region, offering a forum for multilateral regional dialogue in the post-Cold War era.

¹⁵³ Permanent International Secretariat of the BSEC. May 1999 "Inauguration of the Organization of the BSEC," *Press Release*, No: 52 Istanbul, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

¹⁵⁴ Oleksandr Pavliuk. May 2001. "Concerted Action for Sustainable Development to Enhance Peace, Stability and Prosperity in the Black Sea Region," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 1(2): 80.

¹⁵⁵ Valeri Chechelashvili. June-August 2002. "Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Achievements and Main Challenges Ahead," *Perceptions*, 7(2), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

¹⁵⁶ Ercan Özer, op cit.

The BSEC has contributed to the stability of the region through dialogue and contacts, bringing countries and their governments, parliaments, private sectors, local administrations, NGOs, academic institutions and academicians as well as their peoples closer together, promoting interaction at every level.¹⁵⁷ The BSEC summit meetings and working groups also provide a forum for states with outstanding disputes to discuss matters of concern away from the glare of international attention that formal negotiation or other public meetings would attract. It continues to play this role even today, particularly given the fact that some states in the region do not have diplomatic relations with each other.¹⁵⁸ That Turkey and Greece, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Ukraine and Russia even come to the same table to discuss serious regional issues, without being pressured to do so by the US or the EU, is itself a considerable accomplishment. Several countries have already recognized the BSEC's potential and in the near future the organization may even expand to include Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Iran and Uzbekistan, all of which have applied for full membership.¹⁵⁹

The BSEC has come closer to becoming a project-oriented endeavor. It has shown more vitality and imagination than expected at the beginning, with a number of institutional and project ramifications.¹⁶⁰ In this regard, the emerging consensus on cooperation in banking and in countering soft-security threats (combating organized crime and terrorism, collaboration in emergency situations) is especially relevant. The BSEC also proved to be an especially effective organization in environmental matters.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

¹⁵⁹ Charles King, op. cit., p. 60.

¹⁶⁰ Y. Vasilianakos and S. Karaganov. 1998. "The Creation and Evolution of the BSEC. An Assessment," *The Southeast European Yearbook 1997-1998*, ELIAMEP, Athens, p. 244.

The coastal states signed the Bucharest Convention for the protection of the Black Sea against Pollution with three protocols in 1992, then later the Odessa Declaration on the Protection of the Black Sea, these clearly enhance the desire to establish explicit environmental goals and a time-frame that concentrates national, regional and international resources in the most effective means. The protection of the environment is a special area of cooperation. The first BSEC conference on environmental protection and development was held in Tbilisi in 1994. By 1997, work had also begun on a draft of the Black Sea Action Plan to be adopted by all the BSEC members.¹⁶¹ Two significant international agreements, the “Memorandum of Understanding on Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC Region”, and the “Additional Protocol to the Agreement Among the Governments of the BSEC Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in Particular in its Organized Forms” were opened for signature in Kiev on March 6th and 15th 2002, respectively.¹⁶² The sector of distribution and transportation of oil and gas resources may become another real functional area of cooperation.

Since its inauguration, BSEC members have sought to avoid military security debates within the BSEC framework. Nevertheless, the BSEC does deal with security at least on a superficial level in terms of some soft security issues. The BSEC provides additional channels for multilateral and bilateral dialogue, and brings to the table neighboring countries that have often viewed each other with deep suspicion and mistrust. The BSEC has contributed to and supported significant progress in such

¹⁶¹ Oleksandr Pavliuk, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-133.

¹⁶² Valeri Chechelashvili, *op. cit.*

important areas of cooperation such as trade, banking and finance, transport, energy and electric networks, science, statistical data, combating organized crime, and simplification of cross border and customs procedures, etc. The BSEC countries have no illusions of solving all the region's problems. However, they believe that by applying a pragmatic concept of economic cooperation, as a reliable CSBM, with their knowledge of the region and network of cooperation, they can promote trust between and among countries.¹⁶³

The geographical proximity, geo-strategic importance and transregional characteristics require cooperation rather than conflict and competition among the BSEC states. Currently the BSEC organization is seen as the most important CSBM in the region that has the potential to contribute to overcoming potential new dividing lines. A growing atmosphere of mutual acceptance, understanding and confidence, along with bilateral and multilateral agreements between the member states increases hope for a peaceful and prosperous Black Sea region in the future.¹⁶⁴ But it should not be forgotten that the BSEC's new organizational identity demands much better coordination between the BSEC and its subsidiary and affiliated bodies. The BSEC will significantly enhance its overall effectiveness if it strengthens its various bodies and enables them to act as complementary, mutually supportive elements in a single general framework.¹⁶⁵

4.2. GUUAM

GUUAM (the acronym made up of the first letter of each member's name: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) is a group of states with

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, November 1993. "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: A Regional Challenge to European Integration," *International Social Science Journal*, 45 (4): 552.

common problems and threat perceptions. As Taras Kuzio described, the GUUAM countries make up the camp of “Pragmatic Westernizers” against the “Russophile/Slavophil” camp in the 12 states of CIS.¹⁶⁶ The GUUAM Group was formally established as a political, economic and strategic alignment designed to consolidate the independence and sovereignty of former Soviet Union republics. Their common interests lie in the creation of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia energy transportation corridor, support for territorial integrity and the resolution of separatist conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. GUUAM also has a security component that emphasizes a commonly held desire of member states to integrate into NATO and the EU.¹⁶⁷ The common interests of GUUAM countries are linked, directly or indirectly, in opposition to Russian influence. GUUAM countries consider Russia disinterested in resolving these conflicts because of Russia’s respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the separatist parties. They believe that Russia has overtly or covertly supported separatists.¹⁶⁸ It is the undeniable fact that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova all suffered from Moscow-backed secessionist movements in the first half of the 1990s, and Ukraine had this fear in the past concerning Crimea.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, all of them lay enormous stress on territorial integrity.

¹⁶⁵ Oleksandr Pavliuk, op. cit., *Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies*, p. 82.

¹⁶⁶ Taras Kuzio. Summer 2000. “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM,” *European Security*, 9(2): 81-82.

¹⁶⁷ Taras Kuzio. 18 July 2002. “GUUAM Reverts GUAM as Uzbekistan Suspends Its membership Prior to Yalta Summit,” *Eurasia Insight*, available at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071802.shtml>.

¹⁶⁸ Taras Kuzio, op. cit., *European Security*, p. 97.

¹⁶⁹ Anatol Lieven. 18 December 2000. “GUUAM: What is it, and what is it for?” *Eurasia Insight*, available at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight7articles/eav121800.shtml>.

During six years of cooperation the GUUAM group has become an important structure, which is aiming to enhance regional economic cooperation through the development of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor. It has become a forum for discussion on various levels of existing security problems, promoting conflict resolution and the elimination of other risks and threats.¹⁷⁰ It has also provided the emergence of geopolitical pluralism in the former USSR. Analyzing the transformation process of GUUAM from a loose consultative forum into a regional intergovernmental organization might be of great value for grasping the main essence of its development and of its internal dynamics.

4.2.1. Historical background of the GUUAM

The emergence of GUUAM was a unique event since it was establishing new forms of cooperation in a region traditionally dominated by Russia. GUUAM emerged primarily as an international initiative, with political, and security issues at the top of its agenda. The rapprochement among the countries started during the summits of the OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE). At these summits, commonalities were revealed and the countries began to consult and coordinate their positions.¹⁷¹

The real impetus for cooperation among the representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine was provided by the growing international debate over the revision of the CFE Treaty Conference in Vienna, in 1996. Each of the four countries had similar stances on the level and status of the forces of the Russian Federation in the northwest and southwest corners of the former Soviet Union, particularly in the former

¹⁷⁰GUUAM. 2003. "The GUUAM Group: History and Principles," available at <http://www.guuam.org/general/history.html>.

¹⁷¹Iryna Solonenko. June 2001. "*Quo Vadis*, GUUAM?" *Central Europe Review*, 3(3), available at <http://www.ce-review.org/01/23/solonenko23.html>.

Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus military districts. Early on Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova began to issue joint statements insisting that Russian troops on their territory be withdrawn or significantly scaled down.¹⁷² The new governments were concerned that Russia would use the treaty issue as a way of securing a permanent military presence in the ‘near abroad’, and in some instances local Russian forces had also been actively involved in aiding separatists.¹⁷³

On October 10th, 1997 the Presidents of these countries came together in Strasbourg during the summit of the Council of Europe and expressed their common interests in developing bilateral and regional cooperation, European and regional security, and political and economic contacts. They established a loose framework for cooperation by declaring formal cooperation as the GUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). In the Joint Communiqué, the Presidents stressed the significance of their cooperation in establishing a Eurasian, Trans-Caucasus transportation corridor. They underlined the importance of strengthening cooperation with the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of state frontiers, mutual respect, cooperation, democracy, supremacy of law and respect for human rights.¹⁷⁴ At this Summit, GUAM cooperation was stated, by the founding states, to focus on four policy areas: fighting separatism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts; establishing a joint peacekeeping capability; developing the trade corridor linking Europe to Central Asia through the Caucasus; and finally the integration of the

¹⁷²GUUAM countries were especially effective in pressing their case at the 1999 Istanbul Summit, where they were able to secure Moscow’s commitment to a timely withdrawal of soldiers from eastern Moldova and the eventual closure of three Russian military bases in Georgia.

¹⁷³Charles King, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹⁷⁴GUUAM, *op. cit.*

member states into Euro-Atlantic and Atlantic structures.¹⁷⁵ Based on their CFE experience, the countries of GUAM began to focus on key issues at the CIS summit meetings and continued to prepare joint positions on political and security questions in advance of the OSCE ministerial meetings and summits.¹⁷⁶ In 1997, they worked out a proposal on the “16+4” formula for a consultation mechanism with NATO. The proposal from Ukraine was discussed in NATO’s Political Committee, but NATO has resisted recognizing GUAM within the confines of its EAPC.¹⁷⁷

In April 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan refused to renew their membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty, which had not been acceded by Ukraine and Moldova.¹⁷⁸ On April 24th, 1999, GUAM was enlarged by the joining of Uzbekistan at the GUAM summit, which was held during NATO/EAPC’s Summit in Washington D.C., on April 23rd-25th, 1999. Following the inclusion of Uzbekistan, the acronym was changed to GUUAM.¹⁷⁹ At present, GUUAM states coordinate their positions in the EACP and present their agreed positions either under the leadership of Ukraine or Azerbaijan.

During the first eight months of 2000, Moldova and Uzbekistan, due to their acute economic dependency on Russia, largely dropped out of GUUAM processes. Since then, the US role in encouraging GUUAM members has played important part in pulling the group back together again.¹⁸⁰ On September 6th, 2000, at a meeting in New

¹⁷⁵Flemming Splidboel-Hansen. Winter 2000. “GUUAM and the Future of CIS Military Cooperation,” *European Security*, 9(4): 96.

¹⁷⁶Charles King, op. cit., p. 55.

¹⁷⁷The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

¹⁷⁸Gareth M. Winrow, op. cit., p. 133.

¹⁷⁹ See Appendix 3 for the map of GUUAM countries.

¹⁸⁰ Anatol Lieven, op. cit.

York in connection of the UN Millennium Summit, the GUUAM countries emphasized multilateral cooperation within the framework of the group by giving it a multilevel character. To this aim, they decided to convene regular Summits at the level of Heads of State at least once a year, meetings at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at least twice a year, and regular sessions of the Committee of National Coordinators (CNC) on a quarterly basis.

GUUAM has become more institutionalized despite the fact that Moldova was strongly opposed to the idea and warned against turning GUUAM into an alternative to the CIS.¹⁸¹ At the summit in Yalta on June 6th-7th 2001, GUUAM leaders signed a charter that did not transform this intergovernmental group into an international organization. They, however, agreed to convene annual meetings of heads of state, twice yearly gatherings of ministers of foreign affairs (GUUAM executive body), and quarterly meetings of GUUAM's working body, the Committee of National Coordinators.¹⁸² The Yalta GUUAM Charter¹⁸³ puts forward the principal directions of the forum, defines the objectives and principles of multilateral cooperation, and promotes cooperation in political, trade and economic, humanitarian and other spheres of mutual interest.¹⁸⁴ In spite of military cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, GUUAM as a grouping has focused on economic issues, though member states failed to agree to establish a free trade area at the Yalta Summit.¹⁸⁵ In this summit,

¹⁸¹ Iryna Solonenko, op. cit.

¹⁸² GUUAM. 2003. "GUUAM Charter," available at <http://www.guuam.org>.

¹⁸³ See Appendix 2.

¹⁸⁴ GUUAM. 2003. "Final Communiqué of the Yalta GUUAM Summit," available at <http://www.guuam.org>.

¹⁸⁵ Gareth M. Winrow, op. cit., p. 137.

the five presidents declared to journalists that GUUAM was not intending to create its own “military-political formation”.¹⁸⁶

Uzbekistan had suspended its membership prior to 2002 Yalta Summit. Since joining the organization, Tashkent appeared to lose enthusiasm and did not send anyone to its ministerial meetings earlier than 2002. It is important to consider that Uzbekistan left the CIS Collective Security Treaty and in 2001 joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consisting of Russia, China, and three other former Central Asian republics. Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov declared that their main complaint had been the failure of GUUAM countries to remove legal obstacles for the transportation of goods among them. He also left the possibility open for Uzbekistan to resume its membership in GUUAM and stated that development of bilateral relations with the remaining members is still one of the priorities of his country.¹⁸⁷ After September 11th, the Uzbek government forged a bilateral security relationship with Washington and this relationship has brought an estimated 8 billion-US dollars worth of assistance to Uzbekistan. Thanks to this relationship, Uzbekistan established itself as Central Asia’s major power. Thus, Tashkent’s interest in the security aspect of GUUAM declined. Uzbekistan also plays a strategic role in the Central Asian Union (CAU).¹⁸⁸ Uzbekistan’s suspension of its membership in GUUAM has acted as an “alarm bell” for other members of GUUAM to take the actions necessary for further development.

¹⁸⁶ Radio Free Europe. 12 June 2001. *Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, 3/22, available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹⁸⁷ Antonie Blua. 2002. “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Withdraws From GUUAM, Remaining Members Forge Ahead,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, available at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/06/18062002164458.asp>.

¹⁸⁸ Taras Kuzio, op. cit., *Eurasia Insight*.

On July 19th-20th, 2002, in the GUUAM Yalta Summit, important steps were taken by GUUAM countries and a number of significant documents, which enshrine fundamental goals of GUUAM and are aimed at the achievement of strategic missions, were adopted at the Yalta Summit. As in previous summits, the leaders of the four countries underlined the need for the prevention of any actions aimed at the support of separatist and extremist forces, and also at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of GUUAM Participating States in the Yalta Summit. They signed the Declaration on Common Efforts to Ensure Stability in the Region in order to underline the ways and methods for overcoming the challenges of international terrorism, separatism, intolerance and extremism. Signing the Agreement on Cooperation among the Governments of GUUAM Participating States in the Field of Combat Against Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other Dangerous types of Crimes has stressed the decisiveness of GUUAM countries on these subjects. The Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area was also signed in the course of the Summit. It might be assessed as another important action in improving the economic conditions and the most efficient use of commercial potential of the GUUAM Participating States if the early implementation of necessary domestic procedures and entry of this Agreement into force is provided.¹⁸⁹ In 2002, the planned project regarding the establishment of the GUUAM Informational Office in Kiev was implemented. This body might take over important responsibilities in the promotion of cooperation in the GUUAM framework and the interaction of the Grouping with other States and international organizations and institutions.

¹⁸⁹GUUAM. 19-20 July 2002. "Yalta Summit Declaration," available at <http://www.guuam.org>.

Since 1997 GUUAM has continued its rather long period of its existence despite the fact that pessimistic evaluations and comments predicting its disintegration had been made by some analyst. If the decisions of the Yalta 2002 Summit are to be implemented decisively and successfully by GUUAM members, GUUAM will continue to play an important role in the CIS area despite being without Uzbekistan. In this direction, one should not ignore the increasing support of the US to the organization in spheres concerning the combat of terrorism and transnational crime, and the financing of its multilateral projects to facilitate regional security and economic development.

4.2.2. Evaluation of GUUAM's credibility

In terms of regional integration patterns, GUUAM's very existence represents a welcome change from the post-Soviet style of the CIS and similar groupings.¹⁹⁰ The formation and consolidation of GUUAM is unique in Eurasia for the simple reason that it is a voluntary union of five states acting in an independent manner. The voluntary nature of the group is of paramount significance for it sets a precedent of integration based not so much on pressure from a stronger state, but on an understanding of member-states' common national interests.¹⁹¹ GUUAM provides its members with an opportunity to act as "normal states." It has provided a place for its members to act like countries in a key international arena, to negotiate, to share information, and to share approaches rather than being played off against each other. That kind of cooperation alone can be very significant for these states.¹⁹² GUUAM has promoted "a change in the mentality" of the people of the region and given them a new self-confidence about the

¹⁹⁰Elin Süleymanov. September 2001. "Why GUUAM?" *RFE/RL Weekly Briefing*, available at <http://www.rferl.org>.

¹⁹¹ Elin Süleymanov, op. cit.

¹⁹²Paul Goble. 11 July 2001. "GUUAM: What is the Future?".available at <http://www.guuam.org>.

future. Moreover, even the limited joint initiatives within the group's framework indicate its members' readiness to undertake responsibilities in a variety of spheres usually reserved for more established states. The actual participation of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine in international peacekeeping operations, discussions among GUUAM members on securing regional transport corridors, and joint anti-trafficking efforts are examples of this.¹⁹³

GUUAM's role as a link between the areas of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea is, without a doubt, just another of the numerous advantages it can provide in terms of cooperation.¹⁹⁴ Located at important transit crossroads the GUUAM Member States have great importance for routes of transportation between East and West, Europe and Asia. Development of transportation infrastructures positively affects strengthening both domestic and foreign economic links of GUUAM. There are also many potential conflict zones in the regional space of GUUAM. They can generate intrastate and ethnic conflicts of medium intensity. They may expand both vertically and horizontally. Regional integration through economic and political cooperation can facilitate easing internal potential conflicts in GUUAM countries. Even a limited potential of cooperation within GUUAM, will become a positive factor of international safety in the Black Sea Region.¹⁹⁵

Despite the fact that it was launched on the basis of common interests and by countries pursuing similar goals, GUUAM has so far remained a loose alliance of five

¹⁹³Elin Süleymanov, op. cit.

¹⁹⁴H.E. Hafiz Pashayev. 11 July 2001. "GUUAM: What is the future?" Center for Strategic and International Studies, available at <http://www.guuam.org>.

¹⁹⁵ Leopold F. Malafeev. 2001. "GUUAM as a Factor of Political Stabilization in the Black Sea Region," available at <http://www.bsorg.crimeainfo.com>.

post-Soviet states. In reality, many initiatives discussed by members have never been implemented. The decisions taken by GUUAM members during the successive Yalta Summits in 2001 and 2002 might be seen as important steps towards strengthening the organization. It should be noted that the adaptation of the charter was an important step for even closer cooperation among members since it has laid down the basis for the creation of common institutions and an effective decision-making process. These summits have shown that the GUUAM countries are willing to strengthen ties. Nevertheless, both the political and economic weaknesses of the participating states make the organization too vulnerable and dependent on external factors and powers.¹⁹⁶ That's why, external support of the Western powers, especially of the US, and the policies of the Russian Federation toward GUUAM seem more influential regarding the efficiency of GUUAM in the ongoing process.

From the very outset, GUUAM has had an implicit anti-Russian character, all the declarations to the contrary notwithstanding.¹⁹⁷ In fact, such an assertion does not reflect the whole reality. Although the group emphasizes that it is not directed against any country or group of states, Russia still suspects that it wants to bypass Russia. It condemns GUUAM's departure from the grouping's initial focus on Caspian oil and gas pipelines, and Eurasian transport projects and charges that the coalition is stepping up military cooperation. Together with the CAU, GUUAM is an organization within the framework of the CIS where Russia is not a member. While the group was indeed born from the efforts of member-states to oppose excessive concentrations of troops on their

¹⁹⁶ Iryna Solonenko, op. cit.

¹⁹⁷ Esra Hatipoğlu. 2001. "Turkey's Perceptions of GUUAM," available at [http://www.bsarg.crimeainfo.com/IIIMeeting/05%20Hatipoglu%20\(a\).rtf](http://www.bsarg.crimeainfo.com/IIIMeeting/05%20Hatipoglu%20(a).rtf)

territories and in their vicinity during the CFE negotiations in 1996, all GUUAM countries recognize Russia's importance and key role in the region.¹⁹⁸ On the one hand, GUUAM members are attempting to free themselves from the post-Soviet patterns of cooperation under Russia's domination. On the other, they pursue multi-vector foreign policies based upon pragmatic economic cooperation within CIS and political-military security with transatlantic and European structures, particularly with NATO.¹⁹⁹ GUUAM's objective is not opposing anyone but enhancing cooperation among its members. Similarly, Russia's long-term interests are served better by its neighbors becoming stronger, responsible partner-states rather than by facing perpetual instability, being weak and dependent countries.²⁰⁰

GUUAM is not an artificial organization based on coercion, but is the coming together of five countries with common problems and threat perceptions. Some analysts refer to GUUAM as a US-backed initiative, while others explain that the US did not inspire the process. In fact, initially the US was against such coalition-building, the issue of conventional forces' flank limitation agreement in Europe and the resulting delay with the modification of the CFE Treaty irritated the US government, and only much later did the US start to show interest towards GUUAM. Especially after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the US has increased its support to GUUAM by facilitating financial aid and providing some military training capabilities.²⁰¹ The continued existence of GUUAM is proof that geopolitical pluralism has eventually emerged in CIS. It is a fact that this geopolitical pluralism and Russia's domestic difficulties are

¹⁹⁸Elin Suleymanov, op. cit.

¹⁹⁹Taras Kuzio, op. cit., *European Security*, p. 99.

²⁰⁰Elin Suleymanov, op. cit.

preventing Russia's revival as a "great power" through the creation of a new union around itself. Therefore, Western countries feel that they should continue to promote geopolitical pluralism in the CIS through a more active bilateral and multilateral engagement with GUUAM.²⁰²

The only certainty for GUUAM is that the group's future is likely to be determined by the level of economic cooperation between its members. In other words, GUUAM's future certainly depends on its members and the progress of the concrete cooperative initiatives they undertake. However, the group's success or failure is also likely to greatly depend on the extent of U.S. support and encouragement. Its member states have shown that, in spite of many challenges, they are willing and able to work together in order to promote positive changes in their region. Hopefully, GUUAM's western partners are able to recognize the group's promising potential and help realize it.²⁰³

If the group is to succeed in the implementation of a free trade zone, GUUAM might become a strong alternative to CIS, whose convention on free trade is ineffective. Indeed, the establishment of GUUAM radically differs from the integration processes within CIS, which was created on a negative impulse to restore the past and give Russia political leverage, while the aspirations of GUUAM countries are based on economic logic and a desire to strengthen regional stability and security.²⁰⁴ Despite the pessimistic remarks made by some analysts, concerning its future, GUUAM has been consistently

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Taras Kuzio, op. cit., *European Security*, p.110.

²⁰³ Elin Süleymanov, op. cit.

²⁰⁴ Vladimir Socor. 2000. "While You Wait, Why Not Join GUUAM?" *Wall Street of Journal Europe*. September 15.

moving towards deepening and broadening its interactivity and partnership, based on a solid ground of common interests and common aspirations.²⁰⁵ It seems that the GUUAM organization will exist as a cooperative security arrangement and continue to contribute to the peace, security and stability in the Black Sea region.

4.3. The Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR)

In April 2001, ministers and authorized representatives of the Black Sea littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine) signed an Agreement on the establishment of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group, known as BLACKSEAFOR²⁰⁶. By this Agreement, all littoral states came together for the first time in the history of the region to pull their naval forces into a joint formation in order to enhance regional stability and friendship, and to improve interoperability. The formation of BLACKSEAFOR might be viewed as proof for the assumption emphasizing that cooperation and joint action stand as valuable instruments for security from both a political and a military perspective²⁰⁷.

The formation of BLACKSEAFOR was reached through a three-year negotiation process. Before providing information on the formation, it will be of value to mention the development process of CSBMs with regard to naval activities in the Black Sea. It should not be ignored that this process created a suitable atmosphere that led to the formation of BLACKSEAFOR.

²⁰⁵ Vilayat Guliyev. September 2002. Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan at the GUUAM-US meeting New York, available at <http://www.guam.org>.

²⁰⁶ See for details the official web site of BLACKSEAFOR at <http://www.blackseafor.org>.

²⁰⁷ Hasan Ulusoy. February 2002. "A New Formation in The Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR," *Perceptions*, 4(4), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

4.3.1. Historical background

That military/political role of the navies in dealing with regional crises is increasing. Russian proposals notifying and observing certain types of naval activities, exchanging annual plans of such activities, and military information and visiting naval bases had been rejected during the talks in the 1994 Vienna Document of confidence-building and security measures. Although, from the Russian point of view, the initiative was not aimed at restricting activities of the navies and was only intended to enhance transparency of these activities, many influential Western countries opposed these proposals by stating that it would be contrary to international law and would limit free navigation. As a result the sea was not involved in either the 1994 or 1999 version of the Vienna Document. Difficulties concerning the issue in the OSCE framework gave way for a number of interested states to approach the question from a regional perspective.²⁰⁸

Firstly in 1993, Ukraine led an initiative to develop CSBMs with regard to naval activities in the Black Sea. Some distinct characteristics of the Black Sea made this initiative valuable for the region. The Black Sea is a landlocked sea and the 1936 Montreux Convention, in essence, was a major confidence building measure. Following successive negotiations, all littoral states signed a political document under the name of “Guidelines”, by which all sides put forward their decisiveness to cooperate. They adopted the “guidelines” in the Black Sea on February 23rd, 1998. Since then, Ukraine has assumed the role of coordinator of the talks. The negotiations took ten rounds and approximately four years to agree on the text of the final document.

²⁰⁸ Alexander Maslov. 2002. “Naval Cooperation in the Black Sea,” *International Affairs* (A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations), 48(4): 53-54.

During the nine-round negotiations, the Russian Federation proposed that the restrictions on navigation freedom should have been applied to third parties, including NATO's actions on the Black Sea. But this proposal was rejected by all of the other littoral states. Turkey's views have consisted of these following considerations:

- 1) This should be a regional arrangement and it should not stand as a base for other regions of the world.
- 2) This arrangement should not restrict navigational freedom.
- 3) It should not bring any additional limitations except limitations for third parties stated in international agreements involving the Montreux Convention.
- 4) The joint action, which will be executed jointly with third parts, should be treated beyond the scope of this arrangement.²⁰⁹

The tenth round of negotiations for the regime of CSBMs in the Black Sea were held in Vienna on the 1st-2nd November 2001. Thanks to the balancing conciliatory role of Turkey from the beginning of the talks, all sides came to an agreement during this meeting in Vienna. The final text on CSBMs, with regard to naval activities in the Black Sea, was signed on the 25th April 2002 by six Black Sea states. The document came into force on January 1st, 2003 due to the preparation needed for implementing it. This document contains a broad spectrum of voluntary forms of cooperation. Joint exercises, courtesy visits by naval ships, exchanging all sorts of delegations, and annual reciprocal visits of naval bases are among some of the forms. This document is of great value thanks to it being the first regional regime of CSBMs regarding naval activities.

Almost concurrently with the confidence-building negotiations, the idea of setting up in the Black Sea an ad hoc naval cooperation task group involving the same

six littoral states was proposed by former Turkish Navy Forces Commander Salim Dervişoğlu in 1998. The idea was approved and, as a rule, delegates met for three-day sessions once every three months in seaside cities of the parties involved. The countries signed a letter of intent in Ankara on June 28th, 2000.²¹⁰ In the end all littoral states signed the Agreement establishing the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group known as BLACKSEAFOR on April 2nd, 2001 in Istanbul. The importance of BLACKSEAFOR outweighs the significance of CSBMs. Unlike the latter, the former was signed not as a political document but as a legal agreement subject to ratification by the parties.²¹¹ The inauguration ceremony for the first gathering of BLACKSEAFOR happened on September 27th, 2001 on the Turkish base Gölçük.²¹² Beginning from this date, planned exercises have been conducted regularly.²¹³

4.3.2. General features of BLACKSEAFOR

Free will and reaching decisions by consensus are the basis of BLACKSEAFOR group's operations. Despite the fact that BLACKSEAFOR is composed of naval elements only, without the direct participation from Air or Land Forces, it can be supported by elements from other services if necessary. BLACKSEAFOR is not purely a military organization. Neither is it directed against any

²⁰⁹ Source does not wish to be identified.

²¹⁰ Available at [http:// www.photius.com/BLACKSEAFOR/](http://www.photius.com/BLACKSEAFOR/)

²¹¹ Alexander Maslov, op. cit., p. 56.

²¹² Kaloyan Pancheliyev. 2002. "BLACKSEAFOR: A Symbol of Regional Cooperation and Partnership," *Naval Forces*, February/2002: 117.

²¹³ See Appendix 4 for historical background of BLACKSEAFOR.

state, nor intended to be a military alliance. Since it is open to participation of third states by consensus of the Parties, it has a transparent formation.²¹⁴

The mission of the Force is to contribute to and strengthen friendship, good neighborly relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states and thus, to contribute to peace and stability in the Black Sea region through the enhancement of cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces. Among the main tasks of the Force are search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance operations, mine sweeping operations, environmental protection, goodwill visits and any other tasks agreed by all the parties. In scope and membership, BLACKSEAFOR differs greatly from a similar formation called the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) in the Baltic. BALTRON only consists of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, excludes other littoral states and covers only de-mining missions.

When instructed by the Foreign/Defense Ministers or their authorized representatives, BLACKSEAFOR can be called upon to perform the above-mentioned tasks. This could also be done as part of peace operations under the auspices of the UN Security Council or the OSCE upon request from these organizations.²¹⁵ BLACKSEAFOR is intended to operate in the Black Sea, but it can be deployed elsewhere if all the parties choose to do so.

Each activated group will be composed of at least 4-6 ships from the different parties. Main classes of ships that could be allocated to the Force are frigate/destroyer (FF/DD), corvette/patrol boat (FS/PB), mine counter measure (MSM) ship, amphibious ship (LS), auxiliary ship and vessel (AX), and other types of naval vessels including

²¹⁴See Article 19 of the BLACKSEAFOR Agreement, available at <http://www.blackseafor.org>.

²¹⁵See Article 7 of the BLACKSEAFOR Agreement, available at <http://www.blackseafor.org>.

maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and helicopters. The Force can be activated to respond to calls to tackle concrete tasks in extreme situations. In the absence of it the group will come together once a year for one or one and a half months of training cruises as part of the planned activation for mission rehearsals. A request for an unscheduled activation might be made by any of the parties. As an on- call force, units allocated to BLACKSEAFOR will remain at their permanent bases during non-activation periods. Similarly, the group has no permanent headquarters however the state that assumes command will provide them.²¹⁶ Logistical support of participating forces and all the expenses related to BLACKSEAFOR activity is a national responsibility.

The Commander of BLACKSEAFOR (COMBLACKSEAFOR) is a naval officer of the rank of Rear Admiral or Captain designated by the Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee (BSNC). The COMBLACKSEAFOR is appointed for a one-year period and the position rotates in the alphabetical order among the Parties. While he is responsible for the Tactical Command of the group, BSNC is responsible for Operational Command of the Force. The BSNC is an executive body composed of the Parties' naval chiefs or Black Sea fleet commanders. Foreign and defense ministers meet annually, in principle, to take and carry out political decisions and to provide overall political guidance to the BSNC.

4.3.3. Importance of the formation

In the view of the above, the formation of BLACKSEAFOR can be considered as the most concrete military CSBM in the Black Sea region. Certain aspects show it is of particular importance. The military-operational importance of BLACKSEAFOR, as

²¹⁶ See Article 12 of the BLACKSEAFOR Agreement, available at <http://www.blackseafor.org>.

well as the document on CSBMs concerning naval activities in the Black Sea is indisputable. That the Black Sea littoral states are gathered for the first naval formation in the Black Sea makes this formation significant from a military perspective.

It is an undeniable fact that the political importance of BLACKSEAFOR outweighs its military significance. All littoral states in the Black Sea region have overcome the political and psychological barrier by extending CSBMs to naval forces for the first time in international arms control history.²¹⁷ The cooperation through joint actions under the umbrella of BLACKSEAFOR and other regional CSBMs may enhance cooperation among not only naval forces, but also among people. The mindsets of the decision makers of the littoral countries may also be affected positively.²¹⁸ Thus, it brings together all the littoral states.

BLACKSEAFOR also has a humanitarian aspect. Among its tasks are search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and environmental protection. This indicates that the formation gives particular significance to human security and environmental security. The environmental role of the Force could become important as the number of ships carrying oil across the Black Sea increases. Thus, it enhances the countries' ability to act in a coordinated way to deal with problems concerning soft and hard security.

In view of the above, one can argue that the formation of BLACKSEAFOR, in addition to the document on regional naval CSBMs in the Black Sea, as a cooperative security initiative, has contributed to enhancing cooperation and friendship in the region. It confirms the willingness of the region's countries to work together in a wide range of

²¹⁷Alexander Maslov, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

²¹⁸Hasan Ulusoy, *op. cit.*

areas. Now it is one of the symbols of cooperation and partnership in the Black Sea region. It is also hoped that the BLACKSEAFOR initiative will contribute to the widening and harmonizing of European security by supporting the principle of indivisibility of security.

Despite varying national interests, differing political assessments and diverse stages of development of the participating states, the countries in the Black Sea region have continued to seek common solutions to their problems through dialogue, economic cooperation, and creating an environment conducive to regional stability. It seems that they are well aware of the fact that the geographical proximity, geo-strategic importance and transregional characteristic of the region require cooperation rather than conflict and competition.

The BSEC is an important, highly institutionalized and the only comprehensive regional cooperative security organization in the Black Sea region. GUUAM is consistently moving towards deepening and broadening its interactivity and partnership, based on a solid understanding of common interests and aspirations. Both of them act as economic CSBMs. BLACKSEAFOR, together with other regional military CSBMs enhance cooperation among not only naval forces, but also of the people in general. The mindsets of these littoral countries are also affected in a way that may make them more open to cooperation. All of these groups might be seen as effective cooperative security initiatives that keep on providing security, stability and prosperity in the Black Sea region.

The cooperative efforts of these institutions comprise main cooperative security initiatives at a regional level. One should also take into account the role of wider European organizations in promoting peace, security and stability in the region.

Analyzing the activities of the OSCE, NATO and the EU might provide a wider perspective while examining the cooperative efforts in the Black Sea region.

CHAPTER 5

THE ROLE OF WIDER EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS IN PROMOTING COOPERATION IN THE REGION

Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a general acceptance that new multi-institutional security architecture has emerged in and around Europe. From a wider perspective, cooperative security arrangements in the Black Sea region may be seen as subregional initiatives that have the potential to contribute to European security by bringing together diverse groups of states in cooperative frameworks in dealing with specific ‘soft security’ problems. In conformity with this view, the BSEC might be classified as one of these subregional organizations in the Black Sea region. Up to now, we tried to shed light on cooperative security by analyzing regional internal dynamics of the Black Sea region. We should not ignore the role of the wider international organizations in promoting peace, security and stability in the region.

In the European political landscape, there are three major organizations, NATO, the European Union (EU), and the OSCE. The EU and NATO continue to provide political, economic and military security for their members. But, they have also taken on new tasks of expanding their memberships to cover countries from the CEE, developing cooperative ties with both prospective members and those states not likely to join these organizations, and developing operational conflict management and peacekeeping roles.

The OSCE continues to provide broad normative frameworks for European security through the principles of democracy and human rights, but it has also adopted new operational roles in areas such as election monitoring, support for democratization, conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building.²¹⁹ It may be said that the Black Sea region is perceived as one of the subregions in the European continent from the standpoint of these wider international organizations. The Black Sea countries have close interactions with these organizations. (Table 2 presents different levels of institutionalized relationship between them). Recently, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU have become much more supportive of subregional cooperation from Barents to the Black Sea. These wider international organizations are very effective in domestic and foreign policy making processes of the countries in the region, analyzing the activities and perspectives of the EU, NATO and the OSCE in the Black Sea region has great value in grasping their roles in promoting cooperation in the Black Sea region.

5.1. OSCE's Perspective of the Black Sea Region

Today the OSCE is the widest European security organization with 55 members including all of the Black Sea states. OSCE unites a much greater number of members than NATO and the EU in the vast space from Vancouver to Vladivostok as a Eurasian political organization.²²⁰ Although for most of its first two decades the OSCE/CSCE²²¹ had a drawn-out process of political, social, and normative negotiations in the form of irregular, multilateral conferencing. It is now a full-fledged international organization.

²¹⁹ Andrew Cottey. 1999. "Subregional Cooperation and the New European Security Architecture," in Andrew Cottey, op. cit., p. 184.

²²⁰ Vladimir Shustov. 2002. "OSCE's Place in Europe's Architecture," *International Affairs*, 48 (1): 42.

²²¹ The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on January 1, 1995. For reasons of historical accuracy, the original acronym is used concerning developments prior to 1995.

The OSCE plays an important role in promoting peace and security in the European continent, including the Black Sea region. The principle of cooperative security, a comprehensive understanding of security, and a strong emphasis on dialogue are among the main characteristics of the OSCE.²²² The cooperative efforts and activities of the OSCE have contributed directly and indirectly to the peace, security and stability of the Black Sea Region.

The OSCE tries to provide security in the broadest sense. It goes beyond its core military aspects to cover cooperation on economic, social, and human rights issues, which are essential underpinnings of cooperative security and stable international relations. Various treaties have been signed under the auspices of the CSCE/OSCE. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in November 1991 and the “Open Skies” Treaty in March 1992, which were not formally negotiated within the CSCE/OSCE, fall into the category of security building through arms control under the OSCE umbrella.²²³ The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security²²⁴ in 1994, and the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Exchange of Military Information in 1994 are only some of the treaties. The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) is a decision-making body for negotiations on arms control, disarmament, and CSBMs, regular consultations on security related matters also take place in this forum. It is an undeniable fact that all of these developments enhanced the cooperation among member countries in the first half of the 1990s. Considering that

²²² Heiko Borchert and Wolfgang Zellner. January 2003. “The OSCE and Its Contribution to the Stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe,” *Case Study*, pp. 12-13, available at <http://www.ciao.org>.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²²⁴ The 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security was a landmark example in norm setting. The code sets out rules for effective and democratic control of armed forces and provides norms and restrictions for internal security missions of armed forces.

all of the Black Sea countries are among the members of the OSCE, it is not difficult to say that these developments have created a suitable atmosphere for them to cooperate with each other. To put it briefly, the Black Sea region has benefited indirectly from the cooperative activities of the OSCE in its area of responsibility.

It should be noted that OSCE engagement in the Black Sea region has been of segmented nature over the past years. Although the OSCE together with other international organizations provide the principles on which the subregional organizations in the Black Sea area are based, the links between them are still rather weak.²²⁵ Some consider the OSCE to be best suited for the task of coordinating subregional efforts due to its inclusive, pan-European membership, its broad definition of security and its cooperative approach.²²⁶ One may consider that the role of the OSCE is particularly focused on post-conflict settlement and the prevention of conflict resumption in the Black Sea region.²²⁷ Although the OSCE has acted as a framework for discussions of cooperative approaches to subregional problems in areas such as the Black Sea and South-Eastern Europe, it has focused on turbulent spots and security issues in individual

²²⁵Monica Wohlfeld. May 2001. "Subregional Cooperation and the OSCE," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 1(2): 86.

²²⁶Anders Bjurner. 1999. "European Security at the end of the Twentieth Century: The Subregional Contribution," in Andrew Cottey, op. cit. St. Martin's Press, p. 8.

²²⁷The EastWest Institute. May 1998. "Subregional Relations in the Southern Tier: Prospects for Development," Summary Report of a Workshop held in Tblisi, Georgia, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ewi28/>

Table 2: Participation of Black Sea countries in Europe's security architecture (as of June 2003)²²⁸

	Council of Europe	European Union	EAPC	NATO	OSCE	PfP	BSEC	CBSS ²²⁹	CEI	CEFTA	SEE Stability Pact	SECI	SEECF	BEAC ²³⁰
Albania	♦		♦		♦	♦	♦		♦		♦	♦	♦	
Armenia	♦	PCA	♦		♦	♦	♦							
Azerbaijan	♦	PCA	♦		♦	♦	♦							
Bulgaria	♦	AC	♦	•	♦	♦	♦		♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	
Georgia	♦	PCA	♦		♦	♦	♦							
Greece	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦		♦					♦	♦	
Moldova	♦	PCA	♦		♦	♦	♦		♦		♦		♦	
Romania	♦	AC	♦	•	♦	♦	♦		♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	
Russia	♦	PCA	♦	(1)	♦	♦	♦	♦						♦
Turkey	♦	AC	♦	♦	♦		♦					♦		
Ukraine	♦	PCA	♦	(2)	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦		♦			

Abbreviations: AC: Admission Candidate; BEAC: Barents Euro-Arctic Council; BSEC: Black Sea Economic Cooperation; CBSS: Council of Baltic Sea States; CEI: Central European Initiative; CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Association; EAPC: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; O: Observer; PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; PfP: Partnership for Peace; SECI: Southeast European Cooperation Initiative; SEE: Southeast Europe; SEECF: Southeast European Cooperation Process; (1): NATO-Russia Founding Act; (2): NATO-Ukraine Charter; • : Scheduled for membership in 2004.

²²⁸ Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies/IFSH. 2002. *OSCE Yearbook 2001*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, p. 567-582.

²²⁹ CBSS was established in 1992. Member states are: Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation, Norway and Iceland.

²³⁰ BEAC was set up in 1993. Member states are: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Island and the Russian Federation.

Black Sea countries. The whole region has not been in the foreground of OSCE concerns and activities.²³¹ In this regard, it may be helpful to overlook the activities of the OSCE in several turbulent spots in the Black Sea region.

5.1.1. OSCE activities in the conflict areas of the region

In accordance with the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration, the OSCE has developed various methods of sending official missions and personal representatives of the Chairman-in-Office for fact-finding, reporting, monitoring and “good offices” purposes. The OSCE is the specialized Euro-Atlantic-Asiatic institution for early warning, conflict-prevention, crisis and post-crisis management and rehabilitation. The expertise accumulated by the OSCE missions in the region indicates that this organization is capable of acting as a medium for conflict resolution. Concerning conflict situations, OSCE has achieved quite substantial progress in different parts of the Black Sea Region. Recent efforts in Moldova, Northern Caucasus, Georgia, Albania, Azerbaijan and Armenia should not be overlooked. OSCE observer and reporter missions have been sent into an increasing number of regional trouble spots in countries such as Russia (in Chechnya), Georgia (in South Ossetia), Azerbaijan (in Nagorno-Karabakh), Moldova (in Transdniestria), Ukraine and Albania. Top OSCE officials have also personally conducted missions in these areas.²³²

The OSCE Mission to Moldova (since 1993, 10 international members) has been working to facilitate a framework for dialogue and negotiation concerning a lasting peace settlement in Moldova. OSCE efforts are focused on the withdrawal of foreign

²³¹ The EastWest Institute., op, cit.

²³² Cathal J. Nolan. 1999. “The OSCE: Non-military Dimensions of Cooperative Security in Europe,” in Carl C. Hodge (ed.) 1999. *Redefining European Security*. New York, London: Garland Publishing, Inc., p. 315.

(Russian) troops and weapons and the status of Transdniestr. In December 1999, “ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments and coordination of financial and technical assistance” was added to this mandate.²³³ The implementation of a tripartite plan for the disposal of 40,000 tons of Soviet weapons and ammunition submitted by the OSCE in 2001 is progressing slowly. Even though Russia committed itself to complete the process of withdrawal by 2002 at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, the withdrawal has not been completely implemented so far.²³⁴ By November 2002, only six trainloads had left the Transdniestr region of Moldova.²³⁵ With regards to the status of Transdniestr, a lot remains to be done, and common grounds for a solution were not yet found despite the fact that the OSCE has achieved some progress in resolving the problem.²³⁶

The OSCE presence in Albania (since 1997, 38 international members) represents one of the rare cases of OSCE field activity without an ethno-political background. The mission was mandated to consolidate democratization, freedom of the media, human rights, and the collection of weapons and to contribute to election preparation and monitoring.²³⁷ In 1997, the mandate was enhanced to provide “flexible coordination of the efforts of the international community” and to serve “as a clearing-house for information on the international efforts in Albania”. In 1997 the OSCE chairman-in-Office’s Personal Representative assisted in finding a political solution to

²³³Klemens Büscher. 2000. “The Missions to the Republic of Moldova and to Ukraine: A Double-Entry Balance Sheet,” in *OSCE yearbook 1999*, edited by Institute for Peace Research and Security Politics at the University of Hamburg/IFSH. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

²³⁴Heiko Borchert and Wolfgang Zellner, op. cit., p. 16.

²³⁵William Hill. 2002. “Making Istanbul a Reality: Moldova, Russia and the withdrawal from Transdniestr,” *Helsinki Monitor*. 13(2): 129-145.

²³⁶The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

the crisis in Albania. The OSCE monitored the resulting elections.²³⁸ Since 1997, the OSCE has acted as a main coordinator for foreign assistance within the framework of cooperative security in Europe in Albania.²³⁹ In addition, the mission has also been the local chair of the Friends of Albania Group (FOA)²⁴⁰, which held its Sixth International Conference in April 2002 under the auspices of the Chairman in Office and the Spanish European Union Presidency.

The Northern Caucasus remains the most difficult challenge confronting the OSCE. The Mandate of the Assistance Group to Chechnya (AG), originally adopted in 1995 ad interim, was changed in 2001 to be renewed yearly. As in previous years, during 2002, the AG remained the only independent field presence of international organization in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. The OSCE, together with the CoE, is the only international organization that permanently deployed staff over the course of 2002. The mandate was not extended, however, for 2003 and the AG ceased to exist at the end of 2002.²⁴¹ The AG used much of its resources for monitoring and reporting activities where rule of law and human rights were a high priority.

The Mission to Georgia has been in operation since December 1992. It has been involved in promoting a peaceful settlement of conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It tries to monitor and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It also helps in the improvement of civil society

²³⁷ Marta Freeman (ed.) 2002. *Activities in the Field*. p.36, available at <http://www.osce.org>.

²³⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 1999. *NATO Handbook 1998-1999*. Brussels, pp. 319-320.

²³⁹ Sophia Clement. 1999. "The OSCE Involvement in the Albanian Crisis," in Andrea de Guttry (ed.). *The 1997 Albanian crisis and the International Community*, Milano: Franco Angeli, p. 35.

²⁴⁰ The FOA has functioned as an informal forum of countries and international organizations reviewing Albania's progress and coordinating assistance.

²⁴¹ Marta Freeman, op. cit.

and democratic institutions. Since mid-2002, the mission appointed an officer for the purpose of monitoring economic and environmental developments related to security. The monitoring operation on the border between Georgia and Chechnya is a very positive example of OSCE conflict prevention capacities. In order to prevent the potential spillover of the Chechen crisis into Georgia, the OSCE has sent around 40 international monitors, who were carrying out patrols on the Georgian-Russian border since December 1999. The mission was extended in December 2001 to include the Georgia-Ingushetia border.²⁴² Since 2000, the Mission has observed and reported on movements across the border between Georgia and the Chechen republic of the Russian Federation and, since the start of 2002, across the Ingush segment of the border. The OSCE also focuses its attention on the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, one of the so-called frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus. Negotiations are being carried out among all the parties in the conflict, as well as with the Russian Federation and North Ossetian representatives.²⁴³ In the South Caucasus, the OSCE is actively supporting the UN-led peace process in Abkhazia Georgia, which is aimed at a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In addition, the OSCE mission to Georgia is seconding staff to the UN Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia (HROAG).²⁴⁴

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and the OSCE Chair continue to support the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia in their efforts to facilitate a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Special attempts are made to promote CBMs

²⁴² Damien Helly. September 2002. "The Role of the EU in the Security of the South Caucasus: A Compromised Specificity?" The Quarterly Journal No. 3, p.73, available at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/co/co_sept02i.pdf

²⁴³ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

in the military, economic and humanitarian spheres between two countries. The OSCE has continued to provide a framework for discussions between the two countries through its 11-nation Minsk Group, which from early 1997 was co-chaired by France, Russia and the US. Certain proposals of the OSCE Chairman in Office are currently under review.²⁴⁵ The OSCE office in Yerevan was established in March 2000 to promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments in all dimensions. From 2002 the Office began working in the field of military and security cooperation. Implementing the mandate from the Office of the Personal Representative (PR) of the Chairman-in-Office is closely connected with the tasks dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Group (MG) and its Co-Chairman.

Together, the OSCE Mission to Ukraine (1994-1997, 4-6 international members) and the HCNM substantially facilitated a constitutional solution for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, but their contribution to improving the situation of the national minorities there, namely the Crimean Tatars, remained limited. In 1999 the mission was replaced by a project coordinator with a much more limited mandate to plan, implement, and monitor projects between relevant authorities of Ukraine and the OSCE. The OSCE mission had been perceived by Ukrainian officials as a stigmatization of the country.²⁴⁶ Freedom of the media, trafficking in human beings, establishing legal norms in the military and addressing environmental issues have been the subjects of specific projects.

²⁴⁴ Martha Freeman (ed.) 2002. *OSCE Partnerships for Security and Co-operation*, Annual Report on Interaction between Organizations and Institutions in the OSCE area, p.99, available at <http://www.osce.org>.

²⁴⁵ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

²⁴⁶ Heiko Borchert and Wolfgang Zellner, op. cit., p. 14.

5.1.2. Other Activities

In addition to above-mentioned missions, the OSCE has provided member states, as well as Black Sea countries, with election monitoring. In 1992, the Office for free Elections (established in 1990) was renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Today, the ODIHR is the leading pan-European agency for election observation. In 2000, more than 3,000 ODIHR observers monitored 15 elections.²⁴⁷ The HCNM has been active in more than a dozen transnational countries, including Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The HCNM has dealt with minority language use and education (in Macedonia and Romania), and minority participation in public life, from increased representation to arrangements of autonomy (in Crimea/Ukraine). In addition to other newly invented mechanisms, these initiatives have contributed to reducing the tension in conflict areas of the Black Sea region.

At several summits, it was stressed that the OSCE should adopt a more coordinating role in relations among various regional cooperative initiatives. In Lisbon in 1996, a direct link was set up between the OSCE and subregional frameworks. The Lisbon Summit Declaration states that ‘the OSCE could contribute to using fully the potential of various regional cooperative efforts in a mutually supportive and reinforcing way.’ In line with the 1999 Platform for Cooperative Security, the OSCE was offered as an Organization that ‘can take on a coordinating role for inter- and intra-regional initiatives’.²⁴⁸ The GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) group was

²⁴⁷Heiko Borchert and Wolfgang Zellner, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²⁴⁸ OSCE. 1999. “Istanbul Summit Declaration,” available at <http://www.osce.org>.

established while the participating states coordinating their positions relating to the CFE Treaty arrangements within the OSCE on an ad hoc basis.²⁴⁹ After being asked to provide support to the GUUAM countries on the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement signed in July, 2002 by the Heads of State of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan, the OSCE Secretariat's Office of the Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) organized a working party in Kiev, Ukraine in November, 2002.²⁵⁰

In a nutshell, the OSCE has acted as a common ground for discussions of cooperative approaches to regional problems in the areas of the Black Sea and South-Eastern Europe.²⁵¹ The OSCE, together with the EU, already provide the principles on which cooperative security initiatives in the Black sea region are based, but links between them are still rather weak.²⁵² The adoption of the Document-Charter for European Security, in particular the Platform for Cooperative Security and the appointment of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities might improve the interaction between the OSCE and the cooperative initiatives in the Black Sea region. However, it should not be disregarded that the regional cooperative efforts in the Black Sea region are challenged by a lack of resources. Although the OSCE plays an important role in strengthening and developing the normative foundation of Europe's security and in assisting countries in transition, it cannot provide financial and project-

²⁴⁹ OSCE. 1996. "Lisbon Document," available at <http://www.osce.org>.

²⁵⁰ Martha Freeman, op. cit., Annual Report.

²⁵¹ OSCE. 1998. *Regional Environmental Problems and Cooperative Approaches to Solving Them- The Case of the Black Sea Region*, Seminar in Istanbul, 5-6 November, available at <http://www.osce.org>

²⁵² Monica Wohlfeld. 2000. "The OSCE and Regional Cooperation in Europe," in Stephen C. Calleya, op. cit., p. 107.

oriented support, and it cannot be used as a forum for infrastructure programs.²⁵³ While the OSCE may act as a broad framework for encouraging regional cooperation, its lack of political leverage and material resources compared to the EU and NATO is likely to limit its role in the Black Sea region.²⁵⁴

5.2. NATO's Vision for the Region

In the post-Cold War era NATO has transformed itself in order to meet the imperatives of the new security environment. It may be said that the membership and partnership aspects of geographical enlargement together with functional enlargement has preserved NATO's credibility and ensured its survival. Today, NATO is among the most powerful security structures in the world. Taking into account NATO's continuing significance for the Euro-Atlantic area and its enhanced relationships with all of the Black Sea countries at various levels, one cannot disregard the positive role of its activities in the security and stability of the Black Sea region. In this context, it might be argued that NATO's transformation through acquiring new members and inventing new institutional mechanisms, such as the PfP and the EAPC, have contributed to the security of the Black Sea region directly or indirectly. It should be noted that NATO enlargement, together with EU expansion, can be considered among the most stabilizing factors for the region.

From the perspective of NATO, regional security should be perceived within the European security, and should not be directed against anyone. For NATO, basic principles of cooperative security should be activated through regional security arrangements. Although NATO sees regional cooperation as a means of enhancing good

²⁵³ Monica Wohlfeld, op. cit., *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, p. 89.

²⁵⁴ Andrew Cottey, op. cit., *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, p. 43.

neighborly relations among different countries, its involvement in the region is predominantly targeted at separate countries rather than at the region as such.²⁵⁵ NATO's relations with the countries of the Black Sea region have steadily developed and extended to many different levels. Although it is clear that NATO could not provide solutions to all problems of the region, it has a stake there, not only because Turkey borders this volatile area but also because the security of the countries to its south and east are a concern to NATO's own security. NATO's relations with the Russian Federation and Ukraine have a special importance.

NATO is actively establishing itself in the Black Sea. NATO's instrument for this policy is the program known as the PfP, which all Black Sea countries have joined. In the new situation developing in the region, as a result of the conclusion of relevant accords, NATO's southern flank is shifting northward, which means that the Black Sea has become one of its components.²⁵⁶ However, one can say that NATO prefers to use its own recently invented cooperative mechanisms rather than regional or subregional security arrangements in the Black Sea region.

5.2.1. Impact of NATO's enlargement

The process of NATO enlargement might be considered to be a progressive means of contributing to the enhanced stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area, including the Black Sea region. The possibility of NATO membership has already given many states of the CEE an incentive to put an end to old quarrels, border disputes or other unresolved security-related issues. In this framework, a number of bilateral treaties

²⁵⁵ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

²⁵⁶ Nikolai Kovalsky, op. cit., p. 169.

have already been signed. The treaties of Romania-Hungary, Romania-Ukraine, and Poland-Ukraine are just a few which relate to the Black Sea states.²⁵⁷


NATO was also interested in increasing its activities in the South Caucasus, particularly in the area of regional cooperation on “soft” security issues. Increased NATO-Russia cooperation has great importance in the region. The Alliance’s “Open Door” policy will significantly influence stability and security in the Black Sea region. The NATO enlargement is likely to affect the countries included in the Military Action Plan (MAP), such as Romania and Bulgaria, and particularly the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

“Membership Action Plans” were formulated to prepare Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia for membership. The next actual enlargement was agreed on at the Prague Summit on November 21st-22nd, 2002. At this summit invitations were extended to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (See Figure 3). The incorporation of both Romania and Bulgaria will certainly enhance the existing security cooperation and strengthen the security structure in the Black Sea region. It is not difficult to guess that the security produced in the Black Sea region will be projected to Caucasus and contribute to the security of the Caspian and Central Asian energy resources. As Lord Robertson, NATO’s Secretary General, said, “...together with the expansion of the EU, the next round of NATO enlargement will be a major step towards a long-standing goal of the Alliance: to create a Europe whole and free, united in peace,

²⁵⁷Javier Solana. 1999. “NATO beyond Enlargement,” in Anton A. Bebler (ed.). *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*. Westport, London: Praeger, p.5.

democracy and common values, from the Baltic to the Balkans, from the Atlantic to the Black Sea²⁵⁸.

Figure 3: Europe after the next round of NATO enlargement²⁵⁹



5.2.2. Contributions of NATO's institutional mechanisms

Since the end of the Cold War NATO has invented new institutional mechanisms. These mechanisms can be classified as multilateral and bilateral mechanisms concerning the Black Sea region (See Figure 3 for all structural

²⁵⁸ George Robertson. March 2003. "NATO from the Baltics to the Balkans, the Atlantic to the Black Sea," NATO International Online, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030310b.htm>.

²⁵⁹ Available at www.expandNATO.org.

mechanisms). While the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), then EAPC, and PfP constitute the multilateral component, NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine institutional links constitute the bilateral one.

Figure 4: NATO's structural mechanisms (as of 2002)²⁶⁰



5.2.2.1. Multilateral institutional mechanisms

In the 1990s, NATO had tried to respond to the desires of Europe's new democracies to become part of the NATO-centered security system²⁶¹ and had developed several mechanisms in order to reach this objective. From December 1991,

²⁶⁰ Available at [http:// www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int).

²⁶¹ Marie F. Boyer. 1999. "Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions: NATO, the WEU, the EU, and the OSCE," in A.M. Babkina, op. cit., p. 74.

NATO's dialogue and cooperation with its Partner countries in the Black Sea region took place in the framework of (NACC). The NACC was open to former WP states and to the Newly Independent States (NIS). Its main focus was largely on military cooperation.²⁶² The NACC contributed to the promotion of good neighborly relations, disarmament and arms control, peacekeeping, and provided a substantial contribution to strengthening cooperation among NATO Allies and Partner countries. The NACC was little more than a forum for discussions and did not meet the security guarantees that the applicants wanted. NATO, therefore, established another affiliate with a little more military substance, namely the Partnership for Peace (PfP), under the auspices of which various military exercises and other forms of practical cooperation have taken place.

NATO adopted the PfP program at its January 1994 Summit. It provides for military assistance to non-NATO member countries in order to modernize the military in defense sectors, reform of military and defense budgets in view of enlargement, and prepare their armed for peace-keeping requirements.²⁶³ Contributing to interstate relations is one of the key principles of the PfP program. The PfP has been referred to as a "geopolitical eraser", removing or weakening sharp dividing lines between NATO members and non-members.²⁶⁴ Through the PfP program and other cooperative mechanisms, NATO is promoting closer ties between their allies and countries in the region. NATO does not want to import troubles into the alliance. It is believed that the

²⁶²Gülnur Aybet. May 1999. "NATO's New Missions," *Perceptions*, 4(1): 3, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/IV-1/aybet.htm>

²⁶³Sophia Clement. 2000. "Subregionalism in South Eastern Europe," in Stephen C. Calleya, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

²⁶⁴Hans Mouritzen. 2001. "Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region: Real and Imagined," *Security Dialog*, 32(3): 306, in Bertel Heurlin, "Military command Structures in the Baltic Sea Area," in Lars Hedegaard and Bjarne Lidstrom (eds.)1998. The NEBI yearbook 1998. Berlin: Springer, pp. 405-422.

prospect of getting closer to NATO enhances good neighborly relations.²⁶⁵ It also serves both as a framework for the evaluation of potential new NATO members and a mechanism for joint military training and exercises between interested non-NATO nations of the region and the Alliance.²⁶⁶ The PfP program in particular has expanded steadily and now comprises 27 partners offering a broad gamut of activities, including numerous military-to-military relations. All of the Black Sea countries are included in this program. NATO continues to give advice and practical assistance to them. After the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the July 1997 Madrid Summit introduced an enhanced PfP, thus the PfP has become more relevant and operational. The PfP has played a significant role for NATO in exporting different country's traditions of civilian authority, parliamentary habits, and devotions to human rights.²⁶⁷

The PfP program was to remain an integral element of the new cooperative mechanism, incorporating practical military and defense-related cooperation activities. It represents multinational platform for consultations and aims at enhancing coordination among participants. After the Albanian political and financial crisis in the winter of 1997, NATO set up an enhanced PfP for Albania. The great value of the practical experience that countries receive from the PfP was especially apparent in the South Caucasian area. The countries in the South Caucasus are involved in common planning, standardization, policy-making processes and joint military exercises. The PfP contributes to the security of the South Caucasus directly and indirectly by providing

²⁶⁵ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

²⁶⁶ Christopher Bell. 1999. "NATO: Background and Current Developments," in A.M. Babkina, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁶⁷ Daniel N. Nelson. 1998. "Civil Armies, Civil Societies, and NATO's Enlargement," *Armed Forces & Society*, 25(1): 137-160.

some training to countries' security structures and by increasing the level of cooperation with Western institutions. Institutional interactions between NATO and non-member countries of the region provide the newly independent states with a chance to coordinate their security policies with new partners.²⁶⁸

In the military dimension NATO has conducted a number of useful exercises in the Black Sea region, both within and in the spirit of PfP programs, with partner-states. As a result, a community of professionals in the military is being created, ties are blossoming, and a chain-reaction effect is expected. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation regretfully remains passive and uninvolved for political reasons.²⁶⁹ Multilateral PfP military exercises in areas such as peacekeeping training, sea rescue and mine clearance have regularly occurred on a subregional basis and have brought together states not only from the Baltic and Black Seas, but also from Central and South-Eastern Europe. These exercises have contributed to building cooperation and confidence between participant states.²⁷⁰ PfP activities have helped Black Sea states to reform/develop their armed forces. The enhanced PfP set up in 1997 also covers an expanded subregional dimension. It allows for greater participation of partners within NATO's subregional commands of CJTF planning and exercises.

A stronger and more operational partnership between NATO and its NACC partners started to take shape in 1997 with the replacement of the NACC by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). All of the Black Sea countries are members of the EAPC. The Council is the key vehicle non-NATO members use to consult with the

²⁶⁸ Revaz Adamia. May 1999. "NATO: Caucasus in the Context of Partnership for Peace," *Perceptions*, 4(1), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/IV-1/adamia.htm>.

²⁶⁹ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

²⁷⁰ Andrew Cottey, op. cit., *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, p. 41.

Alliance on a range of issues such as regional security, arms control, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, defense planning, and environmental security.²⁷¹ Allies and partners are already exploring, via the EAPC, the possibilities for regional security cooperation in the Black Sea region. The EAPC provides the political dimension. It became the symbol of NATO's strengthened political structure in the post-Cold War era in a newly defined Euro-Atlantic Community whose members count for 46 states today.

5.2.2.2. Bilateral institutional mechanisms

The relations between NATO and Russia, and NATO and Ukraine have a great deal of significance due to their implications on NATO's ongoing enlargement process and the security of the Black Sea region. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are among the core countries of the region. NATO, like the EU, has special ties and interactions with these countries. A stable expansion should not be imagined without the cooperative engagement of these countries. Enhanced cooperation and new institutional ties have been established with these countries in order to provide a more secure environment.

In May 1997 NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. It has provided for enhanced Russian participation in all NATO decision-making activities, equal status in peacekeeping operations and representation at Alliance headquarters at the ambassadorial level. The NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was also established under the Founding Act. The Council has provided each side with the opportunity for consultation and participation in

²⁷¹ Christopher Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

the other's security decisions without a right of veto.²⁷² These initiatives are of great importance as it is hard to conceive of a viable European security structure that does not take into account Russia and its potential contribution to enhancing stability.

Intensified and institutionalized NATO-Ukraine relations serve to strengthen Ukraine's participation in the ongoing effort throughout Europe to building cooperative security. It is clear that this promotes greater stability in all regions, including the Black Sea region, and subregions of the continent.²⁷³ The NATO-Ukraine Charter on Distinctive Partnership, signed on May 30th, 1997, set up a distinct and effective relationship between NATO and Ukraine. This partnership has endorsed NATO's support for Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and democratic development.²⁷⁴

The NATO extension has contributed to further improvement of Ukraine's relations with its immediate neighbors to the west and facilitated bilateral dialogue and solutions to existing problems. In the end, after several years of procrastination, a basic political treaty, recognizing the inviolability of mutual borders, was signed between Romania and Ukraine. This has also contributed to the rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine.²⁷⁵ The NATO enlargement process has facilitated Ukrainian-Russian relations. The growing rapprochement between NATO and Ukraine forced Russian

²⁷²Nikolai Nikolaevich Afanasievsky. 1999. "On the NATO-Russia Founding Act," in Anton A. Bebler, op. cit., pp. 75-79.

²⁷³Norman W. Ray. 1999. "Security Cooperation and the New NATO," in Anton A. Bebler, op. cit., p. 12.

²⁷⁴International Studies Association. March 2000. "Ukraine on the Periphery of Europe," *Columbia International Affairs Online*, Columbia University Press, Paper was presented at the 41st Annual Convention of Sanders International Studies Association, available at <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/Bibliography.%20Corruption%20in%20Eastern%20Europe.pdf> view as html.

²⁷⁵WEU Institute for Security Studies. June 1997. "The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe," *Challiot Papers* No. 26, Paris, pp. 43-62, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org>.

politicians to reconsider their policy toward Ukraine. As a result, the two countries resolved, at least for 20 years, their long-standing bilateral problem by signing three agreements on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and on the Russian military and naval base in Sevastopol. They also signed a treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership at the end of May 1997.²⁷⁶

5.2.3. Other contributions

NATO also contributes to the environmental security of the region by supporting and financing some environmental projects in the region. The NATO Science for Stability Program sponsored two multi-institutional projects, dealing with “Ecosystem Modeling as a Management Tool for the Black Sea” (TU-BLACK SEA) 1993-1997 and “Wave Climatology of the Turkish Coast: Measurements-Analysis-Modeling” (TU-WAVES) 1993-1998. The database management system for environmental and oceanographic data was established at the Marine Hydrophysical Institute at Sevastopol, Ukraine. The Special Working Group 12 (SWG/12) is another NATO initiative, which promotes cooperation among NATO and PfP navies to comply with national and international maritime environmental protection regulations and to foster cooperative efforts for achieving environmentally sound ships and support facilities. The SWG/12 has assisted the Romanian and Bulgarian navies, and is helping to develop an oil-spill response contingency plan. The NATO CCMS sponsored a pilot project devoted to a Review of Ongoing Black Sea Projects for Planning of Future Activities. This project was terminated in 1997. This CCMS project, led by all coastal states and the USA produced a “Black Sea Observation and Forecasting System Science

²⁷⁶ Oleksandr Pavliuk. “NATO Enlargement and Ukraine,” in Anton A. Bebler, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

Plan” provided recommendations for the implementation of a long-term operational ocean observation and forecasting program for the Black Sea.²⁷⁷

In December 1997, NATO ministers of foreign affairs approved the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Center (EDRCC), and a non-permanent Euro-Atlantic Disaster Unit (EDRU). The EDRCC was inaugurated in June 1998. All of the Black Sea countries are participants to this initiative. This represents another symbol of cooperation in the region.

Cooperation and dialogue have become central instruments for NATO. In this regard, all of the above-mentioned institutional mechanisms, including the EAPC and PfP programs, have served as a basis for building closer relationships. Since their creation, they have narrowed the gap between NATO members and its partners. They have represented a very successful program of military and political cooperation and become an essential component in building European cooperative security.²⁷⁸ It should be noted that they have contributed to the security of the Black Sea region directly or indirectly by providing training and security structures and by increasing the level of cooperation between allies and regional states. Despite the fact that NATO’s institutional mechanisms and its enlargement process promote more stability and security in the Black Sea region, it should be stressed that the efforts of the countries in

²⁷⁷Richard C. Ragaini. January 1999. “Environmental Security Issues in the Black Sea Region. Environmental protection Department, Environmental Restoration Division,” This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48, p.5, available at <http://www-erd.llnl.gov/library/AR-132297.pdf>.

²⁷⁸Erdogan Çatal. July 2001. “NATO Enlargement and Its Implications for Turkey.” *Unpublished master’s thesis*. Ankara: Bilkent University, Ankara, p.5.

the region to build stable regional cooperation remain paramount in guaranteeing security.²⁷⁹

5.3. The Role of the EU in the Black Sea Region

Since the end of the Cold War the EU has emerged as an important actor in the Black Sea region. The EU is experiencing a very complex system of multifaceted relations with individual countries in the Black Sea region. The activity of the EU in the region is an important factor in the political and economic life of Black Sea countries, especially after the conclusion of European Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate status of Turkey and the partnership and cooperation treaties with Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and three Caucasian republics.²⁸⁰ All these developments have opened up broad opportunities for interaction in region. In other words, the development of an integrated system of relations between regional countries and the EU has already started. Since the three Black Sea countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) are included in the orbit of the enlargement process and Greece is already a full member, it is not difficult to predict that enlargement will shift the boundaries of the EU eastward to shores of the Black Sea.

The EU's cooperative objectives in the Black Sea region are mainly based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with most of the countries in the region. The Common Strategies with Russia and Ukraine form part of a proximity policy

²⁷⁹ NATO Parliamentary Assembly International Secretariat. November 2001. "The Role of NATO in The Security of The Black Sea Region," This report was presented in Roth-Roth Seminar held on 25-27 October 2001, Bucharest, Romania. <http://www.naa.be/publications>

²⁸⁰ Christopher Hillion. 1998. "Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the European Union and the New Independent States of the Ex-Soviet Union," *European Affairs Review* 3, pp. 399-420, available at <http://www.cbss.st/documents/cbsspresidencies/9german/thecouncil/dbaFile317.html>

reflecting the political and strategic importance of the region to the EU.²⁸¹ Timely and brief analysis of the EU policy towards the Black Sea region may give some information about the increasing importance of the Black Sea region for the EU. The role of the EU in promoting regional cooperation in the Black Sea region might be understood by examining the contributions of EU enlargement and the technical and financial assistance programs developed and implemented by the EU.

5.3.1. The EU focus on the Black Sea region in the post-Cold War era

In the early 1990s, the EU presence in the Black Sea region could be described in terms of “bilateralism”. This initially brought some constraints on EU’s relations with the Black Sea area as a whole during this period. During the years 1992-1994, Europe coordinated its national foreign policies on a case-by-case basis, without collective coherence and within a framework of diverse structures (CSCE, NATO, UN, and EEC). With regard to the regional powers, the EC played a secondary role in the conflicts of 1992-1994, since the attempts to reconcile the two simultaneous processes of enlargement to the east and deepening of engagement in the Balkan crises modified the external priorities of the Union.²⁸²

In the period 1994-1999, after the freezing of regional conflicts in the region, Europeans supported reforms initiated from the perspective of the eventual membership of NIS, including states in the Black Sea region, in the Council of Europe. The EU also has provided financial assistance to regional projects through various programs.

²⁸¹The European Union. 2001. “Tacis Regional Cooperation: Strategic Considerations 2002-2006 and indicative Program 2002-2003” *Strategy Paper*. This paper was adopted by Commission on 27 December 2001, and provides the strategic framework within which EC assistance to multi-country activities will be provided for the period 2002-2006. It also sets out the Indicative programs for regional cooperation activities for the period 2002-2003, which are the revisions of the 2002-2003 Indicative programs. 27 December 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/rsp/02_06_en.pdf

²⁸²Damien Helly, op. cit., p. 70

However, the Commission is bureaucratic and slow, and according to European diplomats, assistance has been poorly targeted with little positive effect on regional stability and development. France has already cooperated with the US on peaceful resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. Germany and Great Britain together with the US and Turkey have provided security assistance to Georgia in the framework of bilateral assistance programs.

By the mid-1990s, the EU increased interaction with subregional cooperative initiatives in its “near neighborhood”. The EU has provided ideas, expertise and financial support via its aid programs. Since the mid-1990s, EU leaders have repeatedly stressed their support for subregional cooperation, emphasizing its importance in the context of EU enlargement (in particular as a means of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe). Leaders have called for greater utilization of EU political and economic resources to promote concrete subregional cooperation.²⁸³ The EU’s foreign policy strategy towards its neighboring subregions/regions has been broadly similar and relatively coherent in that it has focused upon developing interaction to draw the countries of each subregion, to a greater or lesser extent, within the ambit of the Union.²⁸⁴ The EU has established a formal relation in terms of its foreign policy with subregional organizations including the CBSS, Northern Dimension, the BEAC and EMP.

The leverage of the EU in encouraging subregional cooperation in the Black Sea region is much less than in Central Europe, where the prospects of EU membership

²⁸³ Andrew Cottey, op. cit., *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, p. 39.

²⁸⁴ Elizabeth Johansson, op. cit.

is a real goal for such states.²⁸⁵ The BSEC's relations with potential external suppliers of funds for the project, particularly the EU and the EBRD, are less developed than those of the CBSS, the BEAC and the CEI, though ties with the former are now expanding. The problem is that obviously not all EU states have the same level of interest in regional plans. The EU's approach concerning the attitudes toward intra-regional cooperation schemes can be described as asymmetrical at best. Cultural affinities, assessments of stability and pressures by neighboring and interested member states explain why the Commission has placed much more emphasis on the CBSS, which lists the Commission as one of its founding members, rather than the BSEC. One might argue that the EU could have some difficulty in its policy towards the region for a number of reasons. The Black Sea region is not among the top priorities for the EU in the view of current internal structuring of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and more immediate regional priorities are at its periphery, such as Central and South-Eastern Europe.²⁸⁶ The diversity of the EU's ties with the BSEC's members might have complicated EU financial support for BSEC activities.²⁸⁷

The need for greater engagement was not recognized until the late 1990s. The Commission's 1997 report²⁸⁸ on the Black Sea and the BSEC stressed the growing

²⁸⁵ The EastWest Institute. May 1998. "Subregional Relations in the Southern Tier: Prospects for Development," Summary Report of a Workshop held in Tblisi, Georgia, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ewi28/>

²⁸⁶ Yannis Valinakis, op. cit. p. 56.

²⁸⁷ Andrew Cottey, op. cit., *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, p. 34.

²⁸⁸ The European Union. December 1997. "Enlargement will Further Increase the Black Sea Region's Significance to the EU," Brussel: European Commission IP/97/1103, available at www.europa.eu.org. In this report, the Commission expresses its intention to develop a new regional cooperation strategy taking account simultaneously of the common interests of the Black Sea countries and those of the European Union. It would use a package of political, trade and technical assistance instruments suited to promoting cooperation in the field of transport, energy and telecommunications networks, in the field of trade, in the field of ecologically sustainable development and in the field of justice and home affairs.

importance of the region to the EU. It identified transport and energy networks, trade cooperation, ecologically sustainable development, and justice and home affairs as priorities for EU support. The European Commission, in its report to the Council in 1997, affirmed that “Enlargement will further increase the Black Sea region’s significance to the European Union. The EU has a major interest in promoting political stability and economic prosperity in the Black Sea region and stimulating the development links both within the region and with the EU.”²⁸⁹ In the years 1999-2002, the EU declared its support for, and sometimes even became directly involved with, European regional organizations charged with security. In a sense, ‘Agenda 2000’ approves the importance of regional cooperation by stating, “The importance of regional cooperation will increase as the Union enlarges, as its development will promote the openness of the enlarged Union towards its neighbors, so that no dividing lines are drawn on the European Continent.”²⁹⁰

The signature of the PCAs with the three Caucasian states in June 1999 in Luxembourg officially represented a substantial development in EU policy toward the Black Sea region, in particular the Caucasus.²⁹¹ Georgian forces in charge of assuring the security of OSCE monitors received material support from the EU, financed by the CFSP. The European Commission participated in an OSCE campaign for the destruction of light weapons in the South Ossetia; it assisted in the rehabilitation of Azeri regions liberated from Armenian occupation (EXXAP program); it developed measures based on trust (rehabilitation of the Ingury power station between Abkhazia and Georgia); and

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Cees Witterbrood. July-September 2000. “Towards a Partnership with the Countries of the Eurasian Corridor,” *Insight Turkey*, 2(3): 11-12.

it insisted on the closing (initially scheduled for 2004) of the Medzamor nuclear station. In effect the EU could not offer the region genuine guarantees for its security. The Caucasian states have never received any assurance that they would one day become members of the Union. Only some European powers maintain a specific influence, like France and the United Kingdom, in diplomatic groups with the variable geometry of the OSCE of the United Nations. The more guarantees the EU has for the Turks for their membership prospects, the more the hopes and efforts of the Caucasian states to pursue a rapprochement with Europe will increase.²⁹²

In late 1990s the EU, as a stabilizing factor in a volatile region, has closely and increasingly observed the BSEC as a significant access point to Caspian and Central Asian energy resources. Therefore, modernization of the regional infrastructure in energy and transportation facilities connecting the Black Sea to Europe, regional commercial cooperation and the creation of favorable conditions to attract EU and foreign investment, sustainable development, environmental protection and nuclear safety areas have been emphasized as priorities.²⁹³ Since 1997, EU representatives have also been participating in meetings of the BSEC as observers. After the June 4th-5th, 1998 BSEC Council Summit in Yalta the EU Presidency on behalf of the EU declared its full support for Black Sea Cooperation and admired the positive contribution of the BSEC in the development of the region in several areas, including transport, power, telecommunications, and the environment.²⁹⁴ In the declaration issued at the Yalta Summit, emphasis was placed on relations between the BSEC and the EU with a view to

²⁹² Damien Helly, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

²⁹³ Tunç Aybak, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

²⁹⁴ The European Union. 6 June 1998. "EU Presidency Declaration," London, available at <http://www.europa.eu.org>.

forming a “EURO-BSEC” area.²⁹⁵ The EU also declared its willingness to contribute to the regional cooperation in the Black Sea primarily through PHARE, TACIS, MEDA and INTERREG programs.²⁹⁶

5.3.2. Contributions of the EU enlargement

On a bilateral level, the EU provides an environment for improving relations between its new members. It also constitutes an environment in which new members can find cooperative solutions to long-standing issues with neighboring countries. The emphasis that both the EU and NATO place on neighborly relations among candidate countries might be seen as a step in the right direction, on the path of integration, as it accentuates the relevance of bilateral issues.²⁹⁷ The EU has cultivated a close political and economic interest in the Black Sea region. Bulgaria and Romania have launched accession negotiations with the EU and Turkey is also a candidate for EU membership. The EU has concluded PCAs with Former Soviet Union states, including Russia, in order to promote economic and political reforms. PCAs with different partner states provide for trade liberalization and wide ranging cooperation, in the field of environment, justice and home affairs, energy, transport, telecommunications, border networks and economic development, to name a few. TACIS is the main financial instrument supporting the implementation of PCAs.²⁹⁸

EU candidates Romania and Bulgaria have cooperated with their neighbors, including other Black Sea countries, for several reasons connected to their EU

²⁹⁵BSEC. 5 June 1998. “YALTA Summit Declaration,” available at <http://www.bsec.gov.tr>

²⁹⁶M. Fatih Tayfur. 1999. “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis,” *Dış Politika (Foreign Policy)*, 23(1): 48-63.

²⁹⁷Monica Wohlfeld. 1999. “EU and NATO Enlargement and Stability in Central-Eastern Europe,” in Anton A. Bebler, op. cit., pp. 140-143.

membership objective. Candidate countries were required to sign friendship treaties with their neighbors and resolve any outstanding border disputes or cross-border minority rights issues. In addition to meeting stated EU and NATO membership requirements, EU candidate countries in the Black Sea region (as well as noncandidate countries) see subregional cooperation as a step towards European integration and a means of facilitating their membership objective. One should not forget the fact that subregional cooperation remains a step towards Euro-Atlantic integration and not an alternative to it.²⁹⁹

The incentive of EU and NATO membership has strengthened cooperation among Black Sea states. The EU is better positioned and equipped to deal with economic causes of political problems. In the long run, the prospect of membership in the EU is a motivating factor for the member states of the BSEC that can contribute to regional political and economic security. Nevertheless, the EU is not interested or inclined to get directly involved in the solution of Black Sea conflicts. Although the EU is against an excessive increase of Russian influence in the region, it considers the Russian Federation a force of control in the Black Sea region to keep regional conflicts within bounds.³⁰⁰ It is an undeniable fact that after the accession of Poland and Baltic countries into the EU in May 2004, Russia's potential role in the number of important policy issues for Europeans, including environmental management, nuclear-waste

²⁹⁸ The European Union, op. cit., Strategy Paper.

²⁹⁹ Melanie H. Ram, op. cit.

³⁰⁰ Ercan Özer. November 1997. "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Regional Security," *Perceptions*, 2(3), available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/113/II3-6.html>

management and nuclear-reactor safety, will be accentuated.³⁰¹ In this regard, a cooperative relationship with the Russian Federation has utmost importance for the security of the whole continent.

It should be noted that the long-term interests of the Black Sea countries lie with the EU, for the majority of BSEC members joining the EU remains the final objective. Therefore, the promotion of regional cooperation is seen not as an alternative but as part of a transition strategy towards European integration. The EU increasingly sees the BSEC as a preliminary and complementary cooperation process for European integration as part of an overall Pan-European strategy.³⁰² The EU is now making real progress toward the goal of a substantial expansion to the east. At its Copenhagen Summit on December 13th, 2002, the EU member states approved the enlargement of the union to include ten new countries (Southern Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) by May 1st, 2004. The admission of two more East European states, Bulgaria and Romania, is contemplated for 2007. The decision on whether to commence negotiations with Turkey on admission to the EU will be made in December 2004 (See Figure 5)³⁰³.

Through the ongoing enlargement process, the EU territory will be extended to a part of the Black Sea coastal area. Thus the challenge, and potential, of the Black Sea area will be an issue of growing interest for the EU.³⁰⁴ It is the fact that the enlargement

³⁰¹ David L. Boren, John C. Danforth and Alan K. Simpson. July 2001. "Toward the Common Good: Building a New U.S.-Russian Relationship," This report was prepared by EWI Bipartisan Task Force How Should the United States Deal with Putin's Russia, available at <http://www.ewis.org>.

³⁰² Tunç Aybak, op. cit., p. 55.

³⁰⁴ Anna Diamantopoulou. 10 September 2001. Introductory Statement made at the Black Sea-European Union Conference, Tselloniki, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/speeches/2001/010910ad.pdf

of the EU to the east will also bring an eastward extension of a zone of stability and prosperity. In this sense, the EU's role in the promotion of the Black Sea cooperation cannot be underestimated. The question of whether the EU can be enlarged without drawing new boundaries, without forcing the other European states into a peripheral position, is certainly one of the most important challenges facing the continent today.³⁰⁵

5.3.3. Role of the technical and financial assistance programs of the EU

Apart from the aid for Greece and candidate countries, the EU deploys some technical assistance projects in the region, in specific fields, transport, energy, privatization, environment, support for enterprises, etc.³⁰⁶ Technical assistance has provided exclusively through external aid programs. The EU has funded a number of regional co-operation projects in the Black Sea region, through TACIS³⁰⁷, PHARE, INTERREG,³⁰⁸ MEDA, focusing in issues such as energy, transport, the environment, and economic development generally- but also on such matters as justice and home affairs, with support to a variety of groups, small businesses, and local government. Historically, the EU has strongly supported regional cooperative projects provided that they respect free world trade and good-neighborly relations.

³⁰⁵ Jeronim Perovic. January 2003. "Coming Closer or Drifting Apart? EU-Russia Partnership and EU Enlargement in Eastern Europe," Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (Federal Institute of Technology Zurich), Switzerland, available at <http://www.csis.org>

³⁰⁶ Nikolai Kovalsky, op.cit., p. 172.

³⁰⁷ TACIS program, which was established in 1991 by the EC, carries out a number of inter-state programs in specific areas including transport, energy, nuclear safety, environment, cross-border cooperation, telecommunication. The Program aims at promoting inter-state, inter-regional and cross-border cooperation between the partner states and the EU and between the partner states and Central and Eastern Europe.

³⁰⁸ PHARE and TACIS are financial assistance programs for Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the post-Soviet Union space (except the Baltic states which formed part of the PHARE regime) respectively.

Most of the Black Sea states benefit from the EU's PHARE and TACIS technical and assistance programs. As part of EU assistance to the Black Sea countries-, which over the period 1991-1996 amounted to a total of 2,589 million euros – the EU has already contributed significantly to promoting regional cooperation in the Black Sea region. Over the same period an estimated 490 million euros in grants were provided for the activities aimed specifically at strengthening regional cooperation in the Black Sea region³¹⁰: the TRACECA³¹¹ project; the INOGATE³¹² (Rehabilitation, Modernization and Rationalization of Interstate Oil and Gas Pipelines in the NIS) and Black Sea regional Energy Center programs in the field of energy; the Black Sea environment program and other practical projects.³¹³ It can be said that since 1990, the EU has delivered about 1 billion Euros for different cooperation programs in the Black Sea region.³¹⁴ Over the past decade Russia has received direct financial assistance from the EU averaging 200 million Euros for technical cooperation and development assistance projects annually, with two-thirds of this amount being paid under the EU TACIS program. The EU is already financing rehabilitation projects in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The European Commission has a substantial aid program and has spent almost one billion Euros in the Caucasus alone between 1991 and 2001.³¹⁵ It should also be stressed that many infrastructure programs has been implemented thanks to the external

³¹⁰*Regional Surveys of the World: Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia*. 2000. London: Europa Publications, pp.121-122.

³¹¹ The project was initiated in May 1993 to help to develop a transport and trade route from Central Asia to Europe, via the South Caucasus.

³¹² The European Commission program has aimed since 1996 to rehabilitate and modernize regional gas and petroleum transmission systems and to facilitate the transportation of hydrocarbons from Caspian Sea region and Central Asia to European markets, available at <http://www.inogate.org>.

³¹⁴ The EastWest Institute, op. cit.

³¹⁵ Fiona Hill, op. cit.

assistance of the EU. Some of them are of special importance from the point of transportation, energy security, and economic security.

The promotion of transport networks focused on the development of the East-West transport corridor from Europe, across the Black Sea region, through the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia (TRACECA)³¹⁶. This initiative aimed at supporting the political and economic independence of the Caucasus and Central Asia countries by enhancing their capacity to have access to European and world markets through alternative transport routes and enhancing regional cooperation in the region. Cooperation on transport policy of the countries in the region is making significant progress, in the framework of the Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for the development of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia, adopted in 1998 and ratified by 12³¹⁷ countries. Russia has applied for observer status, which offers the potential for linking the original corridor with transport networks in South Russia and the Black Sea ports in Turkey. It has provided the EU a leading role in the region as regards transport policy discussions. Emphasis is now given to the consolidation of the corridor, including the implementation of the Multilateral Agreement on Transport, strengthening the legal framework, improving transport security and safety as well as consideration of environmental aspects.

The INOGATE program is another infrastructure program. It aims at enhancing regional cooperation between producers, transit and consumer countries for interstate oil and gas transport projects, reducing investment risks and promoting the introduction of

³¹⁶TRACECA has launched 22 Technical Assistance projects at a budget cost of 28.155 million euros. Fifteen of the projects have been completed, five are on going and two are currently in the tendering process to commence in 1998.

international standards and environmental and safety concerns in the energy network infrastructure. It paves the way to the rehabilitation and optimization of the East-West oil and gas corridors in compliance with EU and international norms and standards of construction, operation, safety and environmental protection.³¹⁸ INOGATE has also improved the regional trade on oil and gas, in compliance with international standards and operations, and helped to build a well-balanced energy policy, based on supply diversification and security.

In the field of energy, the EU is developing projects of common interest to expand trans-European energy networks. The aim is to create a more favorable environment to consolidate these networks and help diversify the sources of the EU's energy supplies.³¹⁹ The establishment of the Black Sea Regional Energy Center (BSREC)³²⁰ at the beginning of 1995 in Sofia has been an important institutional development in the regional cooperation in energy. The EU sponsored this project. All BSEC member states and Macedonia participate in BSREC. To reinforce cooperation between the EU and the Black Sea countries in energy sector is the main aim of this center.³²¹

However, the EU involvement in the BSEC framework has been minimal (except for the funding of some isolated projects such as the Black Sea Regional Energy Center in Sofia, the Black Sea environmental projects as well as smaller ones, like the

³¹⁷ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

³¹⁸ The European Union, op. cit., Strategy Paper.

³¹⁹ Gareth M. Winrow, op. cit., p. 138.

³²⁰ For more details on the Black Sea Regional Energy Center see the Center's website available at <http://www.bsrec.bg>.

³²¹ Richard C. Ragaini, op.cit., p. 3.

business plans of the BSTDB, and the ICBSS).³²² One can say that the EU Commission is acting cautiously at the present time, whatever its general goodwill. The EU Council does not have a mandate on the BSEC. It is neither a member of the BSEC, nor an observer at that time. But, it should be noted that at a regional level the EU is expanding cooperation with the BSEC. In the fields of energy, transportation and telecommunications in particular, the EU is heavily involved in activities in the Black Sea region by encouraging the development of Trans-European Networks (TENs)³²³, and by funding programs such as TRACECA and INOGATE.³²⁴

The BSEC agreed upon a Platform of Cooperation for future structured relations with the EU in 1999. The BSEC-EU Platform of Cooperation was announced, which referred to future cooperation in several areas. The main areas, in which the BSEC determined to develop cooperation with the EU, were transport, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure; trade and the foreign direct investment; sustainable development and environmental protection, including nuclear safety, science and technology, and combating terrorism and organized crime, communications.³²⁵ The regional cooperative initiatives in the Black Sea region have broader political, economic, and social objectives and activities are a major impetus for regional cooperation between Black Sea countries. Through its programs, the EU is a major actor in cooperation areas covered by them.

³²² Yannis Valinakis, op. cit., p. 54.

³²³ More details on the Trans-European Networks are available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/ten/index-en.htm>.

³²⁴ Gareth M. Winrow, op. cit., p. 131.

³²⁵ The BSEC-EU Platform of Cooperation was approved at the 13th Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of BSEC held in Tbilisi, 30 April 1999.

To put it more precisely, the EU is among the main organizations projecting security, economic development and stability to the Black Sea region. The ongoing enlargement process of the EU, PCAs with most of the Black Sea countries and its technical and financial assistance to the projects on transportation, energy infrastructure, and environmental protection have contributed directly or indirectly to the security in the region to some extent. The focus of the EU on Black Sea region will inevitably increase due to the current EU enlargement process and deepening integration in the EU within the framework of the CSDP. Thus, the EU will intensify its cooperative efforts in the region. That's why, its role in the regional dynamics of the Black sea region will doubtlessly become more important than today.

To summarize, the role of wider European organizations is vital for the peace, security and stability in the Black Sea region. The OSCE, the EU and NATO should address the issues of how they can best promote regional/subregional cooperation and how they might usefully cooperate with subregional and regional groups. It should be noted that the linkage of Black sea countries to the broader European integration process remains the main reason for their participation in regional frameworks. Regional cooperative initiatives are perceived as the available tools or means, and as a first step towards further integration. Wider European organizations thus have a central role to play in the build-up of regional cooperation. Therefore, the enlargement door should be kept open for regional cooperation to succeed.³²⁶

The OSCE efforts in the conflict areas of the region, the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU together with their multidimensional assistance programs have been among the most stabilizing factors in the Black Sea region. It can be said that their

coordinated political, military, economic, social and environmental activities and their support for regional cooperative initiatives in the Black Sea region continue to be the main forces for providing peaceful relations in compatible with cooperative security in the region.

³²⁶ Sophia Clement, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The end of the bipolar rivalry provided states with the opportunity of acting more freely especially at the regional level. In the post-Cold War era, a dynamic re-emergence of regional/subregional and local ties is being witnessed. From the Barents Sea area, the Baltic Sea region, through Central Europe and the Balkans down to the Black Sea region, new frameworks and institutions have been established and a lot of initiatives have been taken since the end of the Cold War, sometimes with the support of outside powers and sometimes by regional countries acting on their own. It can be said that, these initiatives complement the pan-European strategy. They indicate that the security understanding has greatly changed with wider security agendas and new levels of analysis.

Organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment were invaluable in guiding thought and action in the Cold War era; cooperative security, however, is the corresponding principle for international security in the Post-Cold War era. Taken into account the most of the post-Cold War realities of international relations, the concept of cooperative security seems the most appropriate and consistent concept with the analytical framework providing us with analytical tools for examining the security relations among the countries situated in the Black Sea region. Cooperative security suggests a wider security agenda and cooperation among all kinds of actors in

the international arena. It confirms the idea that international relations follow its way through interactions among different levels of international relations. Additionally, it helps to promote a broader approach to security going far beyond the traditional politico-military focus. In this regard, the activities of the regional cooperative security initiatives such as BSEC, GUUAM, and the BLACKSEAFOR and the cooperative role of the OSCE, NATO, and the EU can be analyzed more meaningfully within the framework of the concept of cooperative security.

Today, the Black Sea area is certainly more of a region than it was in early 1990s. The Black Sea region can be defined as the area covered by the eleven states participating in the BSEC. Thus, from a broader perspective, the region comprises an eleven-member subsystem connecting the European Union to Southeastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus NIS and the former Soviet Union to the Middle East. Greece, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine (in alphabetical order) can be classified as the main regional players in the Black Sea region, due to their relatively higher capabilities and their important geographical locations. But, it should be noted that the Black Sea region is a region in being. The process has not been completed yet.

The Black Sea region has a growing significance. It is located at geopolitical and economic crossroads between Europe and Asia. Provided the region's geostrategic position linking Europe and Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes an indispensable trade link and transit route. The enlargement processes of the EU and NATO will increasingly transform the region in Europe's direct neighborhood. That's why the Black Sea Region's security and stability will become vital for European security. The process of EU enlargement and increasing BSEC-EU interaction will

further contribute to the expanding role of the Black Sea region and its growing influence on the adjacent Middle East and Central Asia.

There are various conflictual and problematic issues in the Black Sea region. Conflicts in Chechnya and Karabakh, Abkhazia-Georgia and Ossetia-Georgia, Transdnistr and Ingushetia-North Ossetia constitute the most important ones. Additionally, disputes between Greece and Turkey, Russia and Ukraine affected cooperative relations badly. These developments have prioritized military dimension of the security. Despite the fact that there have been many issues concerning the political, economical, societal and ecological dimensions of security, they have stayed under the shadow of military security. The secessionist forces demand self-determination and independence, while the governments of the countries from which they wish to secede struggle to preserve the territorial integrity of their countries. As a result, although the cease-fires that have been reached can delay further violence, the underlying political conflicts are unlikely to be completely resolved in the near future. The existing cooperative security initiatives have little success in removing tensions and problems among their participants and within the member countries. They however occasionally succeeded to prevent conflicts from dominating all aspects of the cooperative relationships. Economic development, environmental degradation, illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, and ensuring energy security are the other concerns necessitating cooperative efforts.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, new regional initiatives have emerged in the region. The BSEC, the GUUAM and the BLACKSEAFOR can be named as the most important and the most efficient regional cooperative arrangements in the Black Sea region. From a wider perspective, these initiatives can be perceived as elements

contributing to peace and stability not only in the region, but also in the whole European continent. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project (BSEC) has promoted the intensification of regional cooperation and a perception of emerging common interests and is seen as an important CBM in the region. GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldavia) is an organization promoting political and economic cooperation. Plans for the creation of a joint peace keeping battalion remain on the agenda of GUUAM. Ukraine's initiative to enlarge the scope of regional CSBMs to naval area and Turkish initiative on a Special Task Force on Military and Naval Cooperation (BLACKSEAFOR) are among the cooperative security endeavors aiming to strengthen military and naval confidence as well as regional security. The general conclusion is that these regional initiatives provide decisive progress in the peace building process, contribute democratization, increase security, and support macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms, as well as integration of the region into the European structures and rest of the world. They provide a platform for regional cooperation and stabilization (both bilateral and multilateral), help the process of European integration of the countries in the region. They also help to re-establish and develop a regional sense of community and common responsibility. They offer an additional platform for political dialogue and concrete cooperation.

The cooperative security efforts of the OSCE, NATO and the EU have undoubtedly promoted security and stability in the Black Sea region. Contributions of the wider European Organizations, including the OSCE, NATO, and the EU to the peace, security and the stability of the Black Sea region may also be seen in compliance with the core principles of cooperative security. The OSCE efforts in the conflict areas of the region, the enlargement processes of NATO and the EU together with their

multidimensional assistance programs, through their institutional mechanisms, have been among the most stabilizing factors in the Black Sea region. It can be said that their coordinated political, military, economic, social and environmental activities and their support for regional cooperative initiatives continue to be the main forces for providing peaceful relations in conformity with the idea of cooperative security in the region.

All the Black Sea states and their peoples are well aware of the fact that economic recovery, peace and stability in the region are their common interests. They also should see regional cooperation is the most promising strategy for obtaining these goals. In this context, transformation of the conflicts of interests in the region into the cooperative efforts of the interested parties might allow all countries to enjoy long lasting peace, prosperity and sustainable growth within the region. Cooperation among the Black Sea countries and the wider BSEC members is critically important because it has the potential to bridge Europe and Asia. For both security and economic reasons, regional/subregional cooperation has positive implications for countries in the region as well as for the rest of Europe.

APPENDIX 1

YALTA SUMMIT DECLARATION³²⁷

Yalta, 5 June 1998

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), have met in Yalta on 5 June 1998 to assess the progress of the BSEC since its inception by the Istanbul Declaration of 25 June 1992 and to give guidance for its future course and development. We all share the conviction that the considerable progress achieved in our multilateral economic cooperation contributes to enhancing peace, stability and security to the benefit of our peoples, and that time has come to consolidate the international legal personality of the BSEC. To that end we signed the Charter of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, an act which transforms the existing intergovernmental mechanism into a fully-fledged regional economic organization.

2. We share the common view that in the 21st century the role of the Black Sea region, both in world politics and in the global economy, will grow substantially, due to its strategic location and vast economic potential. The BSEC should adapt itself to a world of overall transition and rapid change, embracing new areas of cooperation while deepening the cooperation in the existing ones. This requires a new BSEC economic agenda for the future, in order to meet the challenges of the era of globalization and information society, to stimulate economic growth and innovation, to create employment and build on the synergy that exists between our countries.

3. We reaffirm our commitment to trade liberalization and harmonization of foreign trade regimes, with due regard to the WTO rules and practices. We attach particular importance to the implementation of the existing agreements between the BSEC Participating States and the EU, as well as accession of all Black Sea States to the WTO, as important first steps in that direction and appeal to the EU and WTO to give the BSEC the necessary support to achieve these goals. We also reconfirm our political will to gradually establish a BSEC Free Trade Area as a long-term objective and to elaborate a Plan of Action of a staged process to that end.

4. We are convinced that the private sector should be the driving force for the consolidation of the BSEC process, so that the aim to complement cooperation between governments by cooperation among the business communities be achieved. We support the involvement of the private sector in the development and implementation of the concrete projects of interest to the BSEC Participating States.

5. We express our deep satisfaction with the establishment, early this year, of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki, which will be the main financial pillar of the BSEC and expect it to commence its operations soon. It will give a new quality to the BSEC, whose activities are now evolving from the stage of project

³²⁷ Available at www.bsec.gov.tr/summit_.htm/

development into the stage of project implementation. We appeal to the international banking and financial institutions to strongly support the BSTDB and consider ways and means to participate in its activities.

6. We consider project implementation to be of crucial importance for the consolidation and further development of the BSEC process, especially the implementation of such projects, which create new shared values and generate interaction among the interested states. In this connection, we assess positively the idea of selecting priority areas of cooperation and designating country coordinators on those areas. This new set-up will increase the efficacy of project execution by a strengthened commitment of the Participating States to take the lead in their implementation.

7. The BSEC will further develop its already established cooperation with the European Commission, OSCE, WTO, UN/ECE, UNIDO and other international organizations on the basis of complementarity, comparative advantage and subsidiarity. It should further elaborate the modalities for cooperation with the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Royaumont Process of Stability and Good-Neighborliness in South-Eastern Europe, the Process on Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, the South-East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and explore the possibility to establish cooperation with other interested regional initiatives. We expect that the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation be accorded an Observer status in the UN General Assembly.

8. In this cooperation, the BSEC-EU relationship is of a particular importance. We welcome the Conclusions of the EU Council of Ministers of last December as a first step in the elaboration of a comprehensive strategy of the EU towards the BSEC and its Participating States. We fully share the view that the BSEC-EU cooperation in the fields of transport, energy, telecommunication networks, trade, ecology, sustainable development, justice and home affairs has a promising future. The ultimate aim is to progressively shape the EURO-BSEC economic area.

9. The BSEC has gradually become an attractive partner for cooperation, both for states from our region and beyond. We commend Austria, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic and Tunisia for their constructive participation in the BSEC events as Observers. At the same time we express our gratitude to those states who have applied for membership or observer status and appreciate their desire to become a part of the BSEC family. We agree to discuss the issue of enlargement after the Charter of the Organization of the BSEC enters into force. We will be in a position to address the issue of granting observer or other appropriate status to countries and a number of NGOs in due course.

10. It is our belief that now the BSEC serves more than one purpose. It is an indispensable complementary means to accelerate economic and social progress and hence to consolidate the democratic institutions of all our countries. It is also a preparatory ground for integration into the united Europe of the 21st century. It presents a historic opportunity to build up, step-by-step, our common future together through mutual cooperation at all levels- state to state, region to region, people to people- so that

the Black Sea region becomes one of the economic areas of attraction for investment, of prosperity and stability in the next century.

11. We call upon the National Parliaments to ratify, accept or approve the Charter of the Organization as soon as possible, being convinced that the Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC will also assist in this respect. We highly appreciate the valuable contribution of the PABSEC to the development of the BSEC process, for the prosperity of all and each of the countries here represented.

12. We express our gratitude to the Government and the people of Ukraine for their warm hospitality and excellent organization of the Summit.

APPENDIX 2

YALTA GUUAM CHARTER³²⁸

The Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as “the GUUAM”,

Guided by the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for New Europe and the Charter for European Security of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Reaffirming the provisions of the Strasbourg Declaration of 10 October 1997, the Washington Declaration of 24 April 1999 and the New York Memorandum of 6 September 2000 of the GUUAM Heads of State,

Being devoted to the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, rule of law and market economy,

Acknowledging that regional cooperation is a part of globalization processes, and may contribute to consolidation of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the GUUAM Member States, promote peaceful settlement of conflicts and improve well-being of their peoples,

Proceeding from traditional friendly relations among the GUUAM Member States and their peoples,

Have agreed to adopt the present Charter,

1.Objectives of cooperation of the GUUAM:

- promoting social and economic development;
- strengthening and expanding trade and economic links;
- development and effective use in the interest of GUUAM states of the transport and communication arteries with its corresponding infrastructure situated in their territories;
- strengthening of the regional security in all spheres of activity;
- developing relations in the field of science and culture and in the humanitarian sphere;
- interacting in the framework of international organizations;
- combating international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking.

³²⁸ Available at www.guam.org.

2. Principles of cooperation of the GUUAM:

Cooperation within the GUUAM is based on the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, in particular, on the respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs of the Member States.

3. Directions of cooperation of the GUUAM:

- economy, science, technology and environment;
- transport, energy and telecommunication infrastructure;
- joint investment and financial projects;
- humanitarian sphere, culture, education, mass media, tourism, youth exchange;
- other directions of mutual interest.

4. The Member States may submit proposals regarding the broadening of the cooperation spheres.

5. The GUUAM is open for new members, which fully confirm their full adherence to the objectives and principles of the GUUAM, set forth in its fundamental documents including the present Charter.

6. Organizational structure of the GUUAM:

6.1 The Annual Meeting of the Heads of State is the GUUAM highest body.

The presidency in the GUUAM is carried out by the Member States in alphabetical order for the period between the Meetings of the Heads of State.

At the Meetings of the Heads of State the decisions are made up:

- on the principal directions of political, economic and humanitarian cooperation within the GUUAM;
- on the establishment of the GUUAM specialized bodies;
- on the coordination of positions regarding urgent international life issues of mutual interest.

6.2 The Sessions of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which are conducted, as a rule, twice a year constitute the GUUAM executive body.

The issues of implementation of agreements within the GUUAM are considered and the proposals on further development and deepening of the cooperation for consideration at the Meetings of Heads of State are also prepared at the sessions of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

6.3 The GUUAM working body is the Committee of National Coordinators (CNC), consisting of national coordinators, one from each Member State, appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

The CNC coordinates the activities among Member States within the GUUAM, ensures preparation of the Meetings of the Heads of State and the Sessions of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

The CNC sessions are conducted quarterly in turn in the territory of the Member States. Upon the proposal of any Member States, the CNC extraordinary sessions may be conducted.

7. The decisions within the GUUAM are made by consensus.

8. The GUUAM working languages are Russian and English.

Done at the city of Yalta on the 7th of June 2001, in a single true copy in the Azerbaijani, English, Georgian, Moldovian, Russian, Uzbek and Ukrainian languages, each of them being authentic.

APPENDIX 3

MAP OF GUAM COUNTRIES³²⁹



³²⁹ Available at www.guam.org.

APPENDIX 4

MILESTONES OF BLACKSEAFOR³³⁰

<u>DATE :</u>	<u>ACTIVITY :</u>
20-21 October 1998	1 st Expert Meeting/Ankara-TURKEY. Participants agreed on the Draft Concept Document.
16-18 December 1998	2 nd Expert Meeting/Constanta-ROMANIA. Draft Establishment Agreement, TOR's of Planning Group (PG) and Black Sea Naval Commander's Committee (BSNC) revised.
24-26 February 1999	3 rd Expert Meeting/Istanbul-TURKEY. Worked on Draft Agreement and TOR's.
4-8 October 1999	4 th Expert Meeting/Constanta-ROMANIA.
6-10 December 1999	5 th Expert Meeting/Istanbul-TURKEY. Progress has been achieved on finalizing the work on the Establishment Agreement.
15-17 March 2000	6 th Expert Meeting/Varna-BULGARIA. Agreed on the Draft text of the LETTER OF INTENT (LOI) and decided to propose this text to be signed at the level of senior officials.
17-18 April 2000	Coordination Meeting/Istanbul-TURKEY. The Signatories reiterated their willingness to speed up their efforts for finalizing the Agreement.
15-17 May 2000	7 th Expert Meeting/Odessa-UKRAINE. The Status of Forces (SOF) text agreed in principle. Considered the possibility to sign the LETTER OF INTENT (LOI) in June in Ankara.
28 June 2000	LETTER OF INTENT (LOI) signed by the ambassadors of Black Sea Littoral States in Ankara.
5-7 July 2000	8 th Expert Meeting/Tbilisi-GEORGIA. Substantial progress has been achieved on the Draft Agreement, and Final Status of the Article about "Accession" has been determined. At the same meeting it was decided to have a unique flag and logo for the force, and an annex to the agreement concerning financial matters.
26-28 July 2000	9 th Expert Meeting/Moscow-RF. Status Of the Forces (SOF), Financial matters, the flag and logo were finalized.

³³⁰ Available at www.blackseafor.org.

31 January 2001	BLACKSEAFOR agreement and its annexes were agreed and the agreement was approved by nations through silence procedure.
10-11 March 2001	1 st Planning Group Meeting was held in Tbilisi/GEORGIA.
2 April 2001	BLACKSEAFOR agreement was signed by Ministers and their authorized representatives at the signing ceremony in İstanbul.
19 April 2001	A decision was taken by BSNC at its first meeting in TBILISI to activate the BLACKSEAFOR on 27 September 2001 in İstanbul.
14-16 May 2001	2 nd Planning Group Meeting was held in Constanta/ROMANIA, where BLACKSEAFOR Concept and TORs (BSN-01) and Standing Orders (BSN-02) were finalized.
3-5 September 2001	3 rd BLACKSEAFOR Planning Group (PG) Meeting and Operational Planning Conference (OPC) took place in İstanbul and Activation Operation Order (ACTOPORD-01) was finalized and distributed.
27 September 2001	BLACKSEAFOR First Activation Ceremony took place in GÖLCÜK.
28 Sept.- 16 Oct. 2001	BLACKSEAFOR First Activation Period was conducted.
13-14 February 2002	BLACKSEAFOR-02 1 ST Planning and BSNC Coordination Meeting was held in Sevastopol/UKRAINE.
13 February 2002	The Chairmanship of BLACKSEAFOR Planning Group transferred from TURKEY to UKRAINE.
15-16 April 2002	The Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee Coordination meeting was held in Yalta/UKRAINE.
18 April 2002	The Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee meeting – Yalta/UKRAINE
05-06 June 2002	The final Planning Group meeting for the Second Activation was held in Sevastopol/UKRAINE.
21 June 2002	The Agreement on foundation of BLACKSEAFOR has been ratified by Georgian Parliament.
8 August 2002	BLACKSEAFOR Change Of Command Ceremony was executed in Sevastopol/UKRAINE.
5-28 August 2002	BLACKSEAFOR Second Activation Period was conducted.

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